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ABSTRACT. The Constitution provides no textual guidance for how, as a matter of domestic
law, the United States can withdraw from an Article II treaty. The Supreme Court has not
clarified matters. In the face of this uncertainty, government officials and scholars alike have long
debated whether the President may unilaterally withdraw from a treaty or whether Congress has
a role to play. This Note contributes to the debate by examining the relationship between treaty
withdrawal and war powers through an originalist lens. Through close assessment of the
contemporaneous jus ad bellum, the Note concludes that, at the Founding, treaty withdrawal
presented a clear justification for war. Treaty withdrawal therefore implicates the War Powers
Clause, which assigns primary responsibility for initiating war to Congress. Because the
Founders and their contemporaries likely saw treaty withdrawal as a matter of war and peace,
and because the Constitution entrusts Congress with the power to commence war, this Note
concludes that the original understanding of the Constitution supports a role for Congress in
treaty withdrawal.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite articulating a detailed and arduous process by which the United
States can enter into a treaty, the Constitution remains silent on how the
country can exit from a treaty under domestic law. Article II, Section 2, which
addresses treaty accession, contemplates heavy executive-branch involvement
in the negotiation process with one or more foreign nations and requires a two-
thirds supermajority of the Senate to approve any accord before a treaty
becomes the law of the land.' In contrast, the Constitution provides no textual
guidance on the process for treaty withdrawal, let alone Congress's role in
that process. The Supreme Court has not clarified matters. In Goldwater v.
Carter,' the most recent Supreme Court case on treaty termination, only one
Justice reached the merits;' six other Justices determined that the case was
nonjusticiable.'
The lack of textual and judicial guidance regarding treaty withdrawal has
serious policy consequences. As numerous examples illustrate, there is little to
stop a President from unilaterally withdrawing from a treaty, even though
Congress's involvement would have been required to enter the treaty in the
first place.s Most recently, the Bush Administration unilaterally withdrew from
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.' As a result, the United
States no longer recognizes the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
to hear disputes arising from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,'
1. U.S. CONsT. art. II, 5 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur....").
2. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
3. Id. at ioo6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and White also dissented from the
dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the Court should give the case plenary review. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 996 (Marshall, J., concurring in result without issuing or joining an opinion); id. at
997 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial
review."); id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (writing for a four-Justice plurality that
was "of the view that the basic question presented by the petitioners ... [wa]s 'political' and
therefore nonjusticiable").
S. See Daniel Abebe, One Voice or Many? The Political Question Doctrine and Acoustic Dissonance
in Foreign Affairs, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 234-35 (describing how the political-question
doctrine leads to a "first-mover bias" in foreign affairs that typically benefits the President).
6. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 596
U.N.T.S. 487.
7. Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Sec'y Gen. of the
United Nations (Mar. 7, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87288.pdf
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following that Court's finding that the United States had violated the rights
of death-sentenced Mexican nationals and that the sentences should be
reconsidered.
Congress's role in treaty withdrawal also prominently arose in 2001 when
President Bush withdrew the United States from the nearly thirty-year-old
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Russia.' The ABM was negotiated
by the Nixon Administration and the Soviet Union and approved by two-
thirds of the Senate in 1972. It was viewed as a major development in U.S.
nonproliferation policy with the Soviet Union, imposing strict limits on each
country's ability to develop anti-ballistic missile technology.'o At the time
of withdrawal, myriad experts, policymakers, and foreign leaders warned that
withdrawing from the ABM threatened global nonproliferation policy and
risked upsetting a carefully calibrated relationship with Russia." Despite
these severe warnings, Congress played no formal role in the decision to
withdraw from the treaty that two-thirds of the Senate had approved twenty-
nine years earlier." A federal district court dismissed a lawsuit filed by thirty-
two members of Congress seeking to prevent unilateral executive-branch
withdrawal from the ABM, citing as "instructive and compelling" the Goldwater
plurality's opinion that treaty withdrawal presented a nonjusticiable political
question."
[http://perma.cc/23KS-QVAZ]; see also Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases,
WASH. POST (Mar. 1o, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2198i
-2oo5Mar9.html [http://perma.cc/84ZR-T6LF] (describing the U.S. withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol as the Bush Administration's decision, with no mention of Congress).
8. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
9. Press Secretary, White House, Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (Dec.
13, 2001), http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/ABMwithdrawal.htm [http://perma.cc
/QV5V-MADM].
1o. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
ii. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Criticism Softens on ABM Move, WASH. POST (May 22, 2002), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/o/22/criticism-softens-on-abm-move/c2f
9 a27 c-9 5d7-4 c9d-8880-7683fo7fdedb [http://perma.cc/4BNs-FFYW] (recounting the ABM
withdrawal concerns of the French President, German Chancellor, former U.S. National
Security Adviser, Senate Majority Leader, House Minority Leader, and others); Steven
Mufson & Dana Milbank, U.S. Sets Missile Treaty Pullout, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2001),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/12/14/us-sets-missile-treaty-pullout
/8 3doo6ai-1 3a7-4Scb-bedb-696321a5bo47 [http://perma.cc/T6P2-JCB9] ("Many experts
warned that scrapping the ABM Treaty would spark an arms race in Asia. ).
n. See Manuel Perez-Rivas, U.S. Quits ABM Treaty, CNN (Dec. 14, 2001), http://www.cnn
.com/2ool/ALLPOLITICS/52/13/rec.bush.abm [http://perma.cc/M2V4-Y7EK].
13. Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2002); id. at 2 ("And pursuant to Goldwater
v. Carter, the Court concludes that the treaty termination issue is a nonjusticiable 'political
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Goldwater itself demonstrates how treaty withdrawal implicates important
foreign policy questions. The case arose after President Carter unilaterally
withdrew from a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan' in an attempt to improve
Sino-American diplomatic relations by temporarily ending U.S. obligations to
assist Taiwan in the event of an attack. Senator Barry Goldwater, who led the
suit against Carter, was a strong opponent of the President's China policy,
which he decried as "selling out Taiwan.""s
Given the serious policy implications of treaty withdrawal, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the issue of congressional treaty withdrawal power-and the
relative balance of power between the executive and legislative branches - is
hotly debated. Politicians, practitioners," judges,' and academics' 9 have
weighed in. Yet for all the attention that treaty withdrawal has received, the
question' that cannot be resolved by the courts. Accordingly, this action will be dismissed."
(citation omitted)).
14. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China, U.S.-Rep. of
China, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433 [hereinafter U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty]. See
generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979).
is. Orville Schell, China Strikes Back!, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 23, 2014), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2o14/10/23/china-strikes-back [http://perma.cc/5 4KD-KTK7];
see also Goldwater Criticizes President as 'Hasty' on Foreign Policy, WASH. POST (July
30, 1977), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/o7/3o/goldwater-criticizes
-president-as-hasty-on-foreign-policy/o59oa5aa-dfae-4399-bd4b-ae7fi 30c 36 [http://
perma.cc/3XM8-Z2N8].
16. Compare, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. 25,974 (2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("I believe that it
would be a violation of the spirit of our Constitution [for the President to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty] without seeking the endorsement of the Senate."), with 147 CONG. REC.
25,976 (2ool) (statement of Sen. Warner) ("[S]o far as I know, I do not know of a
requirement or precedent with which our President has broken [by unilaterally
withdrawing], nor did he do anything that was not in accordance with the law and/or terms
of the treaty.").
17. Compare J. Terry Emerson, The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. LEG. 46, 46 (1978)
(arguing that Congress should assert its role in the treaty termination process), with
Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty,
Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to John Bellinger, III, Senior
Assoc. Counsel to the President & Legal Adviser to the Nat'I Sec. Council (Nov. 15, 2001)
(on file with author) (concluding that the President has authority to suspend the ABM).
18. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment);
Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d.
ig. Compare Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, Litigating the President's Power To Terminate
Treaties, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 647, 651 (1979) (arguing that the President wields the authority to
terminate treaties unilaterally), with David Gray Adler, The Law: Termination of the ABM
Treaty and the Political Question Doctrine: Judicial Succor for Presidential Power, 34
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debate has largely overlooked a crucial element: the original understanding of
the relationship between treaty withdrawal and the international law of war.
This Note seeks to contribute to this debate by highlighting the original
understanding of Congress's powers in treaty withdrawal. This Note argues
that, at the Founding, treaty withdrawal provided a just cause of war under the
law of nations. Because the Founders and their contemporaries likely viewed
treaty withdrawal as a matter of war and peace, and because the Constitution
assigns Congress the power to declare war, this Note concludes that the
original understanding of the Constitution contemplated a congressional treaty
withdrawal power.
A few words on the Note's methodology: within originalism,
commentators often distinguish between "original intent" and "original public
meaning." An "original intent" approach inquires into the meaning that the
Constitution's drafters intended.' An "original public meaning" analysis
asks "what meaning constitutional text would have had to a neutral reader
of the English language at the time of the framing."' Yet as Gregory Maggs
has suggested, these modes of originalism may be to some extent
interchangeable.' The understanding of the Framers, as expressed in a
particular document, is typically a strong indication of the public's
understanding.' It is safe to assume that the law of nations was familiar to the
Framers and to knowledgeable citizens.' William Eskridge has explained the
relevance of originalism to the search for constitutional meaning:
20. See generally Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the
Original Meaning ofthe United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 8oi (2007).
21. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Address, Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 Hous. L. REv.
1067, 1074 (2015). As Justice Antonin Scalia explained, this analysis specifically "requires
immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time- somehow
placing out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on
beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day."
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856-57 (1989); see also
Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22
CoNST. COMMENT. 257, 257 (2005) ("[Originalism's] remarkable survival is due, in part, to
originalism itself having morphed in response to these critiques from its previous
preoccupation with the original intentions of the framers to an emphasis on the original
public meaning of the text at the time of its enactment."); Michael Clemente, Note, A
Reassessment of Common Law Protections for "Idiots," 124 YALE L.J. 2746, 2751 (2015)
(explaining the methodology of "original meaning" analysis).
22. See generally Maggs, supra note 20.
23. Id. at 840 ("[T]he Federalist Papers may not have recorded perfectly what the Framers
thought, and they may not have influenced many of the ratifiers directly, but scholars can
and should see them as a repository of the kinds of arguments that concerned citizens were
making and were hearing during the ratification period in 1787-1788.").
24. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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The main reason original meaning is a relevant inquiry is that a strong
body of scholarly work and Supreme Court precedent maintain that the
most legitimate approach to constitutional interpretation at least starts
with original meaning . . . . [A]ll of the [current Supreme Court]
Justices find original meaning relevant (and some believe it
controlling).2
While this Note focuses on the writings of the Framers and the leading
international law theorists of the day, these sources provide clues to both the
intent of the Framers and the "original public understanding" of treaty
withdrawal under international law.
Originalism figures prominently in the debate over the domestic law of
treaty withdrawal. Even advocates of presidential power who rely heavily on
recent historical practice have found it useful to invoke Founding-era
practices.' The relationship between war and treaties also surfaces in
arguments for greater congressional involvement.8
However, despite the Founding generation's clear conception of the
relationship between treaties, war, and peace,' there has been surprisingly
little assessment of how this relationship might be viewed through an
originalist lens.30 To the extent that the Founders' original intent and the
25. Eskridge, supra note 21, at 1072.
26. A recent, major case in which the Supreme Court considered the President's and Congress's
relative powers over foreign affairs, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015), illustrates the
relevance of originalism. Notwithstanding significant disagreement on the final outcome,
each opinion that reached the merits of the case relied heavily on originalist analysis. See id.
at 2076; id. at 2096 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2113
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2116 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The only opinion that did not
consider originalism was Justice Breyer's, which argued that the Court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 2096 (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. The Legal Adviser to President Carter's State Department, for example, pointed (probably
incorrectly) to an 1815 incident in which President Madison had construed unilaterally a
treaty as annulled. Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEx. L. REv.
773, 796 (2014) (citing Memorandum from Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Cyrus R. Vance, U.S. Sec'y of State, President's Power To Give Notice of
Termination of U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (Dec. 15, 1978), in S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., TERMINATION OF TREATIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF
POWER 395, 397 (Comm. Print 1978)). Bradley points out that Herbert Hansell's analysis
that the United States had terminated the treaty was "erroneous." Id. at 796-97.
28. See, e.g., S. Res. 15, 9 6th Cong. (1979) ("Prohibits [treaty] termination or suspension by the
President without Congressional approval where: . .. imminent involvement of the United
States Armed Forces in hostilities or other danger to national security would result . . .
29. See infra Part II.
30. Louis Henkin briefly noted this relationship, but did not explore it in depth. LouIs HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 212-13 (1996) ("In earlier times,
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original understanding of their contemporaries is a factor in the withdrawal
debate, this Note fills an important gap in the literature.
Since the Founding, much has changed about how the United States
concludes agreements with foreign powers. Executive agreements, rather than
Article II treaties, have become the dominant domestic mode of international
lawmaking since World War II." These agreements take one of three forms.
First, in a sole executive agreement, the President alone negotiates a foreign
accord that implicates an issue entirely within the Executive's Article II
authority. Second, in an ex ante congressional-executive agreement, Congress
passes legislation authorizing the President to negotiate an international
agreement on a specific issue.' Finally, in an ex post congressional-executive
agreement, Congress passes legislation approving an international agreement
that the President has already negotiated." Notwithstanding the rise of
executive agreements, Article II treaties remain an important form of
international lawmaking.' While my theory may have implications for other
Congress purported also to denounce or abrogate treaties for the United States or to direct
the President to do so. Those instances, no doubt, reflected the early but recurrent claims of
Congress that it has general powers to make foreign policy, supported by arguments that
the maintenance or termination of treaties is intimately related to war or peace for which
Congress has primary responsibility."). One of the clearest mentions of the relationship
between treaty withdrawal and war powers was in 1829. WILLIAM RAwLE, A ViEw OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMEIuCA 68 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 2d
ed. 1829) ("Congress alone possesses the right to declare war; and the right to qualify, alter,
or annul a treaty being of a tendency to produce war, is an incident to the right of declaring
war.").
31. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (20o8).
32. See id. at 1329.
33. Id.
34. Recent examples of major international agreements given domestic legal force as Article II
treaties following Senate approval include the bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
with Russia and the multilateral Convention on Cybercrime. See Peter Baker, Senate Passes
Arms Control Treaty with Russia, 71-26, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes
.com/2olo/12/23/world/europe/23treaty.html [http://perma.cc/YAA2-C7WT]; Declan
McCullagh, Senate Ratifies Controversial Cybercrime Treaty, CNET (Aug. 7, 2oo6), http://
www.cnet.com/news/senate-ratifies-controversial-cybercrime-treaty [http://perma.cc/VA7B
-SY7B]. Article II treaties will continue to be an important method of lawmaking. If the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is given domestic legal force, it will likely
be as an Article II treaty. See, e.g., Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S.
Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, ATIANTIc (June 10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic
.com/international/archive/2012/o6/-almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law
-of-the-sea-treaty/258301 [http://perma.cc/G6EA-7B56]. Likewise, when President Obama
unsuccessfully attempted to gain approval for the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, he sought to do so through the Article II treaty process. See,
e.g., Ramsey Cox & Julian Pecquet, Senate Rejects United Nations Treaty for Disabled Rights in
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categories of foreign agreements, these agreements pose distinct constitutional
questions. This Note therefore focuses exclusively on Article II treaties.
Part I surveys the existing legal debate surrounding treaty termination. Part
II details Founding-era jus ad bellum and congressional war powers. It
concludes that, under the law of nations, treaty breach constituted just grounds
for war, and at the Founding, treaty withdrawal was tantamount to breach.
Additionally, it concludes that the original understanding of war powers was
broad. Read together, this Note argues, the Founding-era understanding of
treaty termination and the Founding-era conception of war powers suggest
an original understanding that granted Congress a role in treaty withdrawal.
Part III considers both counterarguments to the proposition and contemporary
implications, arguing that the House should have a vote on treaty
terminations.
I. THE DEBATE ON TREATY WITHDRAWAL POWER
Both sides of the debate on treaty withdrawal- those who argue that the
Constitution requires a congressional role, and those who argue that the
Executive has plenary power-agree on at least one thing: the Constitution is
silent on treaty termination. But they differ on what this silence means. The
debate centers on two questions. First, what was the historical practice of treaty
withdrawal, and what are the legal consequences of this history? Second, what
if anything does the structure of the Constitution reveal? On each question,
there is sharp disagreement. This Part briefly describes the existing debate"s to
illustrate how commentators on both sides have overlooked the original
understanding of Congress's powers in treaty withdrawal.
A. For Presidential Unilateralism
Presidential unilateralists rely on constitutional structure and historical
practice to argue that the President may withdraw from treaties without
seeking approval from Congress. The structural argument centers on the
a 61-38 Vote, HIII (Dec. 4, 2012), http://thehill.com/policy/international/27o831-senate
-rejects-un-treaty-for-disabled-rights-in-vote [http://perma.cc/248X-GDBG].
3s. This overview of the debate surrounding treaty termination is necessarily limited to the
major themes. Detailing every argument and counterargument that has been made by
proponents and detractors of presidential unilateralism could form the basis for a Note unto
itself. Yet for all of the arguments made about history and structure, there has been virtually
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Constitution's Executive Power Clause. This clause, unilateralists argue,
suggests that the Constitution reserves to the President alone the power to
terminate treaties. Proponents of this argument cite Supreme Court precedents
such as United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., in which the Court
indicated that the President has broad constitutional powers to conduct foreign
affairs." Louis Henkin's discussion of treaty termination illustrates this line of
argument:
Curtiss-Wright ... recognized the "very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations - a power which does not require as a
basis for its exercise an act of Congress." . . . [This] implies the
authority to make the kind of decision that has to be made for the
United States when a treaty no longer serves our interests, when it is
out of date, when the other side breached it.38
Presidential unilateralists sometimes argue that the placement of the Treaty
Clause in Article II of the Constitution indicates that treaty power belongs
to the Executive.3 9 Such arguments acknowledge that the text contemplates a
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States ofAmerica.").
37. 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). Louis Henkin, in arguing that Article II gives the President
unilateral authority to withdraw from treaties, quoted from this passage directly. See supra
note 19, at 652; infra note 38 and accompanying text. In 1939, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's State Department argued that the President had unilateral authority to
terminate a treaty, based on the "general spirit" of Curtiss-Wright. See Bradley, supra note 27,
at 807-08 (citing Letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Kensuke Horinouchi,
Japanese Ambassador (July 26, 1939), in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES:
DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1939, at 558, 558-59 (1955)). Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S.
155, 188 (1993), and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981), are two more recent
cases in which the Court has affirmed the Curtiss-Wright holding. The executive-branch
defendants in Kucinich v. Bush cited all three cases in their motion to dismiss. See
Defendants' Reply in Further Support of Their Motion To Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
for Summary Judgment, Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2002) (No. 02-1137 (JDB)),
2002 WL 32968629, at *1o [hereinafter Defendants' Reply in Further Support of Their
Motion To Dismiss].
38. Henkin, supra note 19, at 652 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320).
39. See, e.g., Defendants' Reply in Further Support of Their Motion To Dismiss, supra note 37,
at *1i ("[T]he broad grant of the 'executive power' to the President and the placement of the
Treaty Clause in Article 2 (dealing with President's powers) is strong structural evidence that
the Framers intended that such a nonenumerated treaty power belong to the President.");
see also Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[T]he powers conferred
upon Congress in Article I of the Constitution are specific, detailed, and limited, while the
powers conferred upon the President by Article II are generalized in a manner that bespeaks
2403
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
role for the Senate in treaty accession, but emphasize that the primary power
to "make treaties" is granted to the President, with the Senate's role of
providing "Advice and Consent" a secondary clause that limits this primary
power.
A corollary to the textual Treaty Clause argument, according to its
proponents, is the practice of appointing ambassadors.4 o Immediately after
granting the President the power to make treaties "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate,"' Article II, Section 2 indicates that the President "shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors."' There is little doubt that the President can remove an
ambassador without Senate approval, even if the Senate approved that
ambassador's nomination. Accordingly, proponents argue, the President
must have corresponding power to withdraw from treaties notwithstanding
the lack of the Senate's "Advice and Consent.""
There is a related structural argument in favor of unilateral presidential
power to terminate: because the President has unilateral power to end treaty
accession throughout the treaty accession process- including after Senate
no such limitation upon foreign affairs powers."); Bradley, supra note 27, at 780-81
(discussing this line of argument); Henkin, supra note 19, at 651-52.
40. See, e.g., Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 737 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("The majority adopts a Presidential argument and states that if Senate approval were
held to be necessary to terminate a treaty then identical approval would be necessary to
terminate Ambassadors."); DAvID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION
OF TREATIES 89 (1986) ("The case for presidential termination of treaties rests [in part]
upon ... the analogy of treaty termination to the removal of executive officers.").
41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.
42. Id.
43. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 561 n.33 (2010); see also
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986) ("Once the appointment [of an Officer of the
United States] has been made and confirmed, however, the Constitution explicitly provides
for removal of Officers of the United States by Congress only upon impeachment by the
House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate. . . . A direct congressional role in
the removal of officers charged with the execution of the laws beyond this limited one is
inconsistent with separation of powers."). The Bowsher Court harkened back to original
intent and understanding in justifying its decision, citing debates in the First Congress
because they provided "'contemporaneous and weighty evidence' of the Constitution's
meaning since many of the Members of the First Congress 'had taken part in framing that
instrument."' Id. at 723-24 (internal citations omitted). Bowsher is illustrative, but is by no
means the first case to guard presidential power to remove unilaterally officers whom the
Senate had confirmed pursuant to the Appointments Clause. See, e.g., Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
44. See sources cited supra note 40.
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approval but before formal ratification -a logical corollary allows the President
to withdraw any time after accession.4 s
In addition to structural arguments, presidential unilateralists invoke
historical practice. The legal relevance of historical practice was recognized in
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
which noted: "In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . .
may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by 5 1 of
Art. II."146
The "historical gloss" argument, as it is sometimes called, suggests that
"what's past is prologue"' in assessing the legality of a unilateral treaty
termination.'8 For example, counsel to President Carter in Goldwater noted, "At
a minimum, the Congress's passivity with respect to treaty terminations over
the past 6o years suggests an acknowledgement that the President has the
45. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 43, at 561-63 n-33. Oona A. Hathaway explains the process for
treaty accession following initial negotiation between the United States and its
counterparty:
The President has the power to present (or not present) a negotiated treaty to the
Senate for approval. Once presented, it cannot be revoked by him without the
Senate's concurrence. Yet this is something of a pyrrhic power, for while the
Senate is vested with the authority to give its "advice and consent" on the treaty,
it is the President who actually ratifies the treaty once the Senate has offered its
approval. Hence even if the Senate were to vote to approve the treaty, a President
who has turned against it (or who never was for it, the treaty having been
submitted to the Senate by a prior administration) might simply refuse to file the
papers necessary to give that consent effect-and do so entirely legally.
Hathaway, supra note 31, at 1323-24. She further notes that "[s]ome have argued that because
the President has the power not to ratify a treaty even after the Senate's consent has been
given, the President must have the parallel authority to withdraw that ratification regardless
of the Senate's position on withdrawal." Id. at 1324. Specifically, she cites Hunter Miller for
the proposition that "[a]t any stage in the making of a treaty, until it is internationally
complete, the President may, in the exercise of his own discretion, bring the proceedings to
an end." Id. at 1324 n.260 (quoting Hunter Miller, Historical Adviser, Dep't of State,
Address to the Students of Columbus University: Treaties and the Constitution (Jan. 13,
1937), in 16 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASES 49, 52 (1937)).
46. 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
47. WILUAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, SC. 1.
48. For an extensive discussion of how presidential unilateralists have used historical practice to
support their position, and this line of reasoning's relationship to Youngstown, see Bradley,
supra note 27, at 783-88. But see Jean Galbraith, Response, Treaty Termination as Foreign
Affairs Exceptionalism, 92 TEx. L. REV. 121, 123 (2014) (arguing that the changing historical
practice on treaty termination "reveals a far more dramatic shift than Justice Frankfurter
would view as legitimate," and is part of a "foreign affairs exceptionalism").
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constitutional authority to act on his own initiative." 9 Curtis A. Bradley has
recently documented myriad other instances in which executive-branch lawyers
and scholars have similarly relied on recent practice to suggest that sufficient
gloss has formed to augment and protect the President's prerogative to
withdraw unilaterally.5
As a factual matter, recent history does offer examples of unilateral
termination. The historical precedent of such unilateralism probably began
with President William McKinley's 1899 termination of portions of a
commercial treaty with Switzerland. According to Bradley's historical survey,
this was the first instance in which a President terminated treaty obligations
without any form of congressional approval;s' however, because McKinley's
actions were a response to a potential conflict between the treaty and a tariff act
that Congress had passed two years earlier, Bradley argues that McKinley's
action might not necessarily be viewed as purely unilateral.5 2 The first
indisputably unilateral termination occurred in 1927 when President Calvin
Coolidge withdrew from an antismuggling convention with Mexico without
the ex ante or ex post approval of either house of Congress.s" During his
presidency, President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to unilaterally withdraw
from treaties much more aggressively than his predecessors, which Bradley
describes as "[e]stablishing a [p]attern" that his successors would invoke and
which led to the modern rise in unilateralism.54 As noted, this pattern has
influenced the most recent instances in which the United States has withdrawn
from treaties: President Carter's termination of the Taiwan Treaty and
President Bush's terminations of the ABM Treaty and the Vienna Protocol on
Consular Relations, all of which were undertaken without congressional
consent.ss
B. Against Presidential Unilateralism
Opponents of presidential unilateralism offer their own structural and
historical arguments. The structural argument against presidential
unilateralism emphasizes separation of powers. Its proponents challenge the
notion that executive power can be inferred from constitutional silence or from
49. ADLER, supra note 40, at 149.
50. Bradley, supra note 27, at 807-21.
si. Id. at 798-99.
52. Id.
S3- Id. at 805.
54. Id. at 807-o8.
55. See supra notes 6-15 and accompanying text.
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the placement of the Treaty Clause in Article II. For instance, the plaintiffs in
Kucinich v. Bushs6 argued that constitutional silence should not be read as a
grant of power to the Executive because "[t]he history of American
jurisprudence is replete, as it should be, with instances of courts, from the
lowest to the highest, going beyond the letter of the Constitution to its spirit,
its essence, its core values."'
On this view, core values militate against unilateralism and in favor of a
role for Congress. Proponents invoke "the . . . system of checks and balances
imbued in the Constitution from its very origin.", 8 These checks and balances
suggest a role for Congress not just because of its role as a coordinate branch of
government, the argument goes, but also because involving Congress respects
the nature of a federal system in which each state's national representatives
have a say.s"
Here lies a closely intertwined argument: once ratified, a treaty takes its
place alongside federal legislation as the "supreme Law of the Land.",6 o As such,
some have argued that the principle governing repeal of federal legislation
mirrors the proper principle for the repeal of treaties. Since the repeal of
ordinary legislation passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the
President requires both congressional and presidential approval, a logical
corollary is that repeal of a treaty adopted by the Senate and President requires
approval of both.1
56. 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002).
57. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 32, Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d I (No. 02-1137),
2002 WL 32968625 [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment].
58. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 6, Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d I (No. 02-1137), 2oo2 WL
32968622. Raoul Berger made a similar argument, drawing from an article adapted from an
amicus brief filed with the Goldwater Court by a pair of international law scholars:
The "fundamental principles of a democratic sharing of power, and of checks and
balances to protect that sharing," in the words of McDougal and Reisman,
"require that the Congress be accorded a role in the termination of all
agreements . . . ." Certainly exclusion of Congress cannot rest on the total silence
of the text respecting a power to terminate, for that silence equally affects the
President.
Raoul Berger, The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 Nw. U. L. REV.
577, 585 (1980) (quoting Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Can the President
Unilaterally End Treaties, NAT'L L.J. (May 28, 1979), quoted in 125 CONG. REC. S7,o45 (daily
ed. June 6, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater)).
59. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 40, at 85-88.
6o. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
61. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 40, at ioi; Berger, supra note 58, at 585.
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Those who support joint presidential-congressional withdrawal also argue
that historical practice supports their position. Senator Goldwater's counsel
suggested that "the normal and accepted method by which the United States
has terminated treaties or obligations thereunder is by action of the President
together with the approval of the Senate or the Congress. More recently,
the plaintiffs in Kucinich relied heavily on history in asserting that "the case
for a mandatory congressional role in termination of any treaty is deeply rooted
in . . . the history of joint executive-legislative action in terminating treaties.6
Some academics echo this argument, positing that any trend towards
presidential unilateralism is relatively recent. Raoul Berger, for example,
challenged the notion that a historical gloss had formed and argued that "for
the Republic's first 130 years treaties were abrogated, with one exception, by
Congress or its authorization, not by President and Senate, much less by the
President alone."6 4
As a historical matter, Berger's claim appears to be partially correct.
Throughout early historical practice, Congress played a role in treaty
withdrawal -but the precise nature of its role varied. The first time the United
States terminated a treaty, Congress played a direct role. As the country
prepared for war with France in 1798, Congress passed legislation declaring
that the four treaties the United States had signed with France "shall not
henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the government or citizens of
the United States.",6  The congressional debates over whether to enact the
statute reflected no "doubt about Congress's constitutional authority to
terminate the treaties., 66 As Thomas Jefferson noted in the Manual of
Parliamentary Practice in light of this precedent, "Treaties being declared,
equally with the laws of the U[nited] States, to be the supreme law of the land,
it is understood that an act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed
and rescinded."6 , Subsequently, until at least 1899,68 Congress played some
62. ADLER, supra note 40, at 149 (citing the plaintiffs' brief in Goldwater).
63. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 57, at 37.
64. Berger, supra note 58, at 605.
6s. Bradley, supra note 27, at 789 (citing Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578, 578).
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § 52 (Wash.,
Samuel Harrison Smith i8o)). Justice Iredell made a corollary point regarding
congressional power to rescind treaties in the 1796 case Ware v. Hylton. His opinion in that
case suggested that, under the Constitution, Congress alone could determine that a treaty
was void following breach by the United States' counterparty. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) ("If Congress, therefore, (who, I conceive,
alone have such authority under our Government) shall make such a declaration, in any case
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role in the decision to terminate treaty obligations.6 ' The precise nature of this
role often varied, sometimes taking the form of ex post approval.7o
The upshot of early historical practice is that, whether through resolutions
or statutes, with the full Congress or just the Senate, ex ante or ex post, at the
President's urging or not, the legislative branch played some role in
withdrawing from international agreements. To be sure, the process of
congressional approval was inconsistent. But it seemed well understood that
some role for Congress was necessary, and the early historical period
undoubtedly supports the position of those opposed to unilateralism. More
recent tradition, which may have begun as early as 1899, and which accelerated
under President Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration, cuts the other way.'
All told, this historical record suggests a mixed bag of evidence. Historical
practice alone is unlikely to be dispositive.
II. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF JUS AD BELLUM AND
CONGRESSIONAL WAR POWERS IMPLIES A ROLE FOR CONGRESS
IN TREATY WITHDRAWAL
This Part seeks to augment the debate between the presidentialists and the
congressionalists. It examines evidence that helps contextualize original
understanding: the relationship between Founding-era jus ad bellum, treaty
withdrawal, and congressional war powers. This Part begins by demonstrating
that, at the Founding, jus ad bellum conferred on parties suffering treaty breach
the right to go to war. Next, it shows that, at the Founding, treaty withdrawal
was tantamount to breach because treaties were generally expected to exist in
perpetuity. Finally, this Part examines the broad scope of congressional war
powers. Taking these three elements together, I argue that the original
understanding of the Constitution contemplated a role for Congress in treaty
withdrawal.
like the present, I shall deem it my duty to regard the treaty as void, and then to forbear any
share in executing it as a Judge.").
68. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
69. See Bradley, supra note 27, at 788-801.
70. For a detailed history of the various forms of congressional consent, see id.
pi. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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A. Treaties and Jus Ad Bellum During the Founding Era
1. Treaty Breach Presented a just Cause of War
The international law principles governing the "right to go to war" are
known as jus ad bellum. These principles separate "just wars" -those that are
legally permissible -from "unjust wars," which violate the law of nations and
are therefore illegal.' To comprehend Founding-era conceptions of
congressional treaty withdrawal powers, one must examine the jus ad bellum of
that time. Because of the close relationship between war and treaties in
contemporaneous international law, jus ad bellum provides critical context for
the original understanding of treaty powers.
Founding-era jus ad bellum entitled a nation to go to war to secure its rights
and redress violations of those rights. "Just war" included virtually any cause
that could be litigated in a domestic context because there was no international
analogue for redressing grievances. As Hugo Grotius-the influential Dutch
jurist whom many consider the "father of international law"'-explained,
"The grounds of war are as numerous as those of judicial actions. For where
the power of law ceases, there war begins."' Under a Grotian conception ofjus
ad bellum, then, virtually any right that might be enforced against an individual
in a domestic court would be just grounds for war. Grotius identified three
primary just causes of war: the "right to defend, to recover, and the
encroachment on which it is right to punish."s He reiterated that "sovereign
powers have a right not only to avert, but to punish wrongs."76
Other seminal treatises on the law of nations, including treatises by Emer
de Vattel" and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, reflected the same view. Though
they used slightly different terminology, Grotius, Vattel, and Burlamaqui each
made the same two key points. First, not all war was just; second, a nation was
72. See International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions, INT'L CoMM. RED CROSS
8-9 (2014), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-oo2-0703.pdf [http://perma.cc
/KSGS-VMNM].
73. Mark W. Janis, The Seas and International Law: Rules and Rulers, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 306,
3o6 (1984).
74. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 75 (A.C. Campbell trans., M. Walter
Dunne 1901) (1625).
7S. Id.
76. Id. at 83.
77. 3 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS §§ 25-28, at 483-84 (BIa Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758).
78. 2 JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 454 (Peter
Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2006) (1748).
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entitled underjus ad bellum standards to use force to prevent the violation of its
rights or recover damages from the violation of those rights.
Treaties played a key role in creating rights, violations of which nations
could punish. Each of the three aforementioned authors understood that
treaties between nations were analogous to domestic contracts between private
parties, and that a nation that had entered into a treaty with another nation
therefore had the right to expect performance from its counterparty.
Burlamaqui's treatise goes so far as to suggest that the obligation of nations to
fulfill treaty promises actually exceeded that of private parties in contracts
because "were it otherwise, not only public treaties would be useless to states,
but moreover, that the violation of these would throw them into a state of
dissidence and continual war." 79 Vattel, likewise, explained in a section entitled
"Obligation of observing treaties" that "the breach of a perfect promise is a
violation of another person's right, and as evidently an act of injustice, as it
would be to rob a man of his property.,so He continued in his next section,
entitled "The violation of a treaty is an act of injustice":
As the engagements of a treaty impose on the one hand a perfect
obligation, they produce on the other a perfect right. The breach of a
treaty is therefore a violation of the perfect right of the party with
whom we have contracted; and this is an act of injustice against him."'
Grotius, too, explained that treaties constituted "the perfect obligation of a
promise, and [are] attended with consequences similar to an alienation of
property,"8' and elsewhere referred to the violation of treaties as "an odious
act.",8
Under jus ad bellum, treaty breach was a just cause of war. Burlamaqui and
Vattel clearly indicate, and Grotius strongly implies, that a functioning treaty
system in which countries kept their promises was necessary to avoid chaos
and war. In practice, nations were likely to resort to force when another nation
violated the treaty promises it had made. Legally, treaty violation legitimated
the use of force. Each of these writers' seminal treatises illustrates the legality
of force in response to treaty violations by noting that, first, treaties conferred
79. Id. at 518.
3o. 2 VATTEL, supra note 77, § 163, at 342.
81. Id. 5 164, at 343.
82. 2 GRoTIUs, supra note 74, at 134. An Editor's Note in the 1814 translation of the document
makes clear that "[a]ll the reasonings of Grotius, on this, and on every other point, are
intended to apply not only to the transactions of individuals, but to conduct and affairs of
nations." Id. at 131.
83. Id. at 183.
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rights, the violation of which constituted injury; and second, jus ad bellum
permitted nations to use force to punish injury. As Vattel explained, in the
instance of treaty breach, a sovereign "is at liberty to ch[oo]se the alternative of
either compelling a faithless ally to fulfil[1] his engagements [through force],
or of declaring the treaty dissolved by his violation of it."4 There can be no
doubt, then, that jus ad bellum at the time of the Founding-as articulated by
some of the most prominent treatise authors" - allowed nations to go to war to
recover or punish the violations of treaties.
Moreover, the Founders were aware that treaty breach was considered a
just cause of war under contemporaneous international law. It is well
documented that, when delegates to the Constitutional Convention gathered in
Philadelphia in 1787, they were familiar and deeply concerned with the law of
nations. Scholars have noted that several constitutional provisions are
imbued with the Founders' concern that the nascent Republic join the family of
nations and comport with its international obligations. 87The Founders knew
the work of Grotius, Vattel, and Burlamaqui, among others,88 and writings by
some of the most prominent Convention delegates reflect an understanding
that treaty breach presented a just cause for war. John Jay, for example, noted
that treaty violation was a preeminent cause of war: "Thejust causes of war for
84. 2 VATrEL, supra note 77, § 20o, at 367-68.
8S. See Stiphane Beaulac, Vattel's Doctrine on Territory Transfers in International Law and the
Cession ofLouisiana to the United States ofAmerica, 63 LA. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (2003) (" [T] here
can be little doubt that [Vattel's] contribution [to the development of international law] was
seminal."); Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, io U. PA. L. REv. 26, 35 (1952) (noting that treatises by Grotius, Vattel, and
Burlamaqui, among others, "were an essential and significant part of the minimal
equipment of any lawyer of erudition in the eighteenth century"); Janis, supra note 73, at
306 (noting Grotius's reputation as "the father of international law").
86. Indeed, the Constitution explicitly mentions the law of nations. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
("The Congress shall have power to . . . define and punish piracies and felonies committed
on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations . . . ."). For discussions of the role
that the law of nations played in various constitutional debates, see, for example, David M.
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law
of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 932, 935 (2010); J.
Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power To Define and Punish Offenses Against the
Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REv. 843, 896-900 (2007); and Kathryn L. Einspanier, Note,
Burlamaqui, the Constitution, and the Imperfect War on Terror, 96 GEo. L.J. 985, 990-92
(20o8).
87. See, e.g., supra note 86 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 689 (1972); Andrew Tutt, Treaty Textualism, 39 YALE J. INT'L
L. 283, 293 (2013); Einspanier, supra note 86, at 991-92.
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the most part arise either from violations of treaties, or from direct violence."8 9
For Jay, this principle presented a real threat that justified a federal treaty-
making power because a single federal government was less likely than
multiple state governments to commit treaty violations.9 o
Jay and other delegates were aware that treaty breach constituted a just
cause of war. During the colonial era, Great Britain twice cited treaty breach as
a just cause for war in manifestos against foreign powers. 9' The first few
decades of the new Republic also reveal strong evidence that the Founders
knew what consequences could follow treaty breach. Supreme Court Justices
cited Grotius, Burlamaqui, and Vattel's writings on treaties in the early case
Ware v. Hylton, in which the Court held that an article in the Treaty of Paris
protecting creditors annulled a Virginia state law nullifying certain debts.92
George Washington, in assuming command of the military at President John
Adams's request during America's "Quasi-War" with France, noted France's
"disregard of solemn treaties and the laws of nations." Moreover, several
early treaties included provisions that essentially established a grace period
around the default proposition that treaty breach by one party confers upon the
other party a right of war.94 If, however, the concerns were unanswered, war
would be just and perhaps expected.
8g. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 14 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
go. Id.
gi. See Kent, supra note 86, at 885-86. A forthcoming study demonstrates that a significant
proportion of war manifestos from the mid-sixteenth through mid-twentieth centuries cited
enforcement of treaty obligations as cause for war. See Oona Hathaway et al., Just Causes of
War: Evidence from War Manifestos (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
g. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). The practice of considering the Founding-era law of nations to
determine original understanding and intent continues to this day. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v.
Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085 (2015) (citing Vattel and Grotius).
93. Letter from George Washington to President John Adams (July 13, 1798), in 1 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (James D. Richardson ed.,
1902), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1o894/1o894.txt [http://perma.cc/YJRS-SP3G].
94. Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the United States of America and His Imperial
Majesty the Emperor of Morocco, U.S.-Morocco, art. 24, Jan. 1787, 8 Stat. ioo. Similar
provisions were included in other so-called "Barbary Treaties." See, e.g., Treaty of Peace and
Amity, U.S.-Dey and Regency of Algiers, art. 16, Dec. 22-23, 1816, 8 Stat. 244; Treaty of
Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Tunis, art. 23, Aug. 28, 1797, 8 Stat. 157; Treaty of Peace and
Friendship, U.S.-Dey and Subjects of Tripoli of Barbary, art. tz, Nov. 4, 1796, 8 Stat. 154;
Treaty of Peace and Amity, U.S.-Dey and Regency of Algiers, art. 22, Sept. 5, 1795, 8 Stat.
133. It is important to note that such provisions, to the extent they were used, did not render
obsolete treaty breach as a cause of war, as is clear from sources cited throughout this Note.
See Kent, supra note 86, at 886 ("[I]t was common practice for sovereigns, before resorting
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This jus ad bellum standard was not a waning quirk of the eighteenth-
century law of nations. Nearly a century after the Founders gathered at the
Constitutional Convention, treaty breach still created the potential of legally
justified war. In 1884, Justice Miller, writing for the Supreme Court, noted,
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It
depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the
honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its
infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and
reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which
may in the end be enforced by actual war.9 s
All of this indicates that the Founders and their contemporaries were keenly
aware that, under thejus ad bellum standards at the time, treaty breach by one
party conferred upon its counterparty a right to go to war. As I will show, this
awareness provides important context for understanding the relative powers of
Congress and the President.
2. At the Founding, Treaty Withdrawal Was Tantamount to Breach
This section demonstrates that, at the Founding, treaty breach and the
domestic law of treaty withdrawal were one and the same. This equivalency
explains why Founding-era law governing treaty breach might inform
contemporary law on treaty withdrawal. Not all treaties resemble those at issue
in Goldwater96  and Kucinich," which included provisions that govern
withdrawal as a matter of international law (which is distinct from the
domestic law of treaty withdrawal)." Some treaties lack such withdrawal
to armed force or other methods of coercion, to state their legal justifications, which
typically included a breach of treaties or the law of nations by the other side.").
95. Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 58o, 598 (1884).
g6. U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 14, art. X ("Either Party may terminate it
one year after notice has been given to the other Party.").
97. ABM Treaty, supra note io, art. XV(2) ("Each Party shall . .. have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty. . . It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to
withdrawal from the Treaty.").
98. Statement of the United States, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the
People's Republic of China (December 15, 1978) in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: JIMMY CARTER: JUNE 30 TO DECEMBER 31, 1978, 2266 ("[T]he United
States of America will notify Taiwan . . . that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance with the
provisions of the Treaty."); see also Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, White
House, Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (Dec. 13, 2001) (on file with
author) ("[T]he United States is today providing formal notification of its withdrawal from
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provisions and exist in perpetuity such that any withdrawal is equivalent to
breach.99 Crucially, while treaties today commonly provide for unilateral
withdrawal (assuming the withdrawing party gives notice), this was not the
case during the Founding era. As Curtis Bradley notes, until 1822, no U.S.
treaty contained a unilateral withdrawal provision. 0o
Indeed, important treaties made during the Founding era contemplated
perpetual effect. Consider the Model Treaty, which the First Continental
Congress passed in 1776 as a prototype for U.S. treaties. The Model Treaty-
which was first implemented in accords with France-included "perpetual"
terms governing a host of commercial interests.o' It "served as a template for
further commercial treaties that the United States would make in the coming
years." 0 2 Any attempt to withdraw from these treaties, with their "perpetual"
terms, would be tantamount to breach if the counterparty did not consent.
Indeed, Russia risked war when in 1870 it publicly denounced parts of
a perpetual treaty. Fourteen years earlier, Russia had entered the Treaty of
Paris, which prohibited naval exercises in the Black Sea. When it announced
its intent to denounce, Russia's counterparties to the Treaty expressed their
consternation. The United Kingdom and Prussia even broached the subject of
war. The powers evaded combat, however, prudently deciding to meet and
agree to a new pact, the so-called London Protocols of 1871.103 The preliminary
the ABM Treaty. As provided in Article XV of that Treaty, the effective date of withdrawal
will be six months from today.").
99. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work oflts Eighteenth Session, 4 May-19 July
1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, at 259, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/191 (1966), reprinted in [1966]
2 Y.B. Int'I L. Comm'n 172, U.N. Doc. A/63og/Rev. i (noting "so-called perpetual treaties
[as] treaties not making any provision for their termination"); see also Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, art. 56, May 23, 1969, 1980 U.N.T.S. 331, 345 (1969) (reflecting
customary international law that perpetual treaties may not be unilaterally terminated
absent special circumstances). The Vienna Convention is a reflection of customary
international law and mirrors the longstanding law and practice at the time of its adoption.
See Lea Brilmayer & Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, Treaty Denunciation and "Withdrawal"
from Customary International Law: An Erroneous Analogy with Dangerous Consequences, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 217 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/treaty-denunciation-and
-qwithdrawalq-from-customary-international-law-an-erroneous-analogy-with-dangerous
-consequences [http://perma.cc/R5SC-WSXB].
1oo. Bradley, supra note 27, at 779.
101. Plan of the Treaties with France of 1778, pmbl, in JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (Chauncey Ford et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Model Treaty].
102. Off. of the Historian, The Model Treaty, 1776, U.S. DEP'T STATE, http://history.state.gov
/milestones/1776-1783/model-treaty [http://perma.cc/GEL2-2EZB].
103. See SIR GEOFFREY BUTLER & SIMON MAcCOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
462-63 (2003); THE GREAT EUROPEAN TREATIES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 312-18
(Augustus Oakes & R.B. Mowat eds., 1918); GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
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protocol clarified that no signatory could withdraw from or modify its treaty
obligations unless all other parties consented, thus reaffirming the inviolability
of treaties."o4 Had Russia's counterparties chosen to go to war over the
withdrawal, their choice would have been legally justified.
To be sure, there were certain narrow circumstances under which a state
could justifiably breach or denounce a treaty. A fundamental change of
circumstance (rebus sic stantibus) was-and remains today-an acceptable
reason to withdraw from a perpetual treaty.' For example, an 1815 treaty with
Great Britain opened St. Helena to the United States for commercial purposes.
When Britain imprisoned Napoleon on the island, it invoked rebus sic stantibus
to close St. Helena to the United States for commercial purposes,
notwithstanding the treaty. Six years later, upon Napoleon's death, Britain
reopened St. Helena. While the United States never explicitly acknowledged
that Britain had acted appropriately, the move did not seem controversial. ,6
Invoking rebus sic stantibus does not always prove uncontroversial, however.
In denouncing the Treaty of Paris, Russia invoked rebus sic stantibus as well
as several other defenses to no avail-its counterparties rejected those
invocations. The Russian example illustrates that the mere invocation of rebus
sic stantibus or other defenses did not automatically absolve the breaching or
withdrawing party of potential consequences. Rather, as in the Russian case, a
countersigning country could reject the invocation and consider war. Thus,
from the perspective of domestic law, principles such as rebus sic stantibus
might not obviate the need for congressional authorization. Were a U.S.
President to act like the Russian sovereign, the possibility of war would be very
real. That chance, in turn, might imply a role for Congress-the representative
body tasked with deciding whether to go to war.
In the original understanding, then, withdrawal was tantamount to breach.
Treaties were expected to be permanent. This explains how the Founding-era
law of nations on treaty breach can inform the debate over the original
understanding of treaty withdrawal. At the time, absent special circumstances,
withdrawal by the United States constituted breach because perpetual treaties
could not be terminated without the consent of both (or all) parties.
DIPLOMACY 138-39 (Michael Graham Fry et al. eds., 2002); IAN ST. JOHN, GLADSTONE AND
THE LOGIC OF VICTORIAN POLITICS 220-21 (2010).
104. BuTLER & MACCOBY, supra note 103, at 463.
105. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 62, May 23, 1969, 198o U.N.T.S. 331, 345
(1969); Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries 256-57
(1966).
o6. John P. Bullington, International Treaties and the Clause "Rebus Sic Stantibus," 76 U. PA. L.
REV. 153, 158-59 (1927).
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B. Congressional War Powers
Section II.A demonstrated that, under Founding-era jus ad bellum
standards, treaty breach - and, therefore, withdrawal - was a just cause of war,
conferring on the aggrieved party a legal right to declare war on the breaching
party. This Section discusses the Founding-era understanding of war powers
under the Constitution. It shows that the Founding-era Congress was
contemporaneously understood to have broad powers to decide issues of war
and peace. Because treaty withdrawal constituted treaty breach, and treaty
breach implicated issues of war and peace, Congress's broad war powers
suggest that Congress would have been understood to play a role in treaty
withdrawal.
1. The Original Understanding Was that Congress Had Broad War Powers
The Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to declare war in the
so-called "War Powers Clause."' Many scholars have noted convincing
evidence that Congress had robust power under the original understanding of
this Clause. The wording of an initial draft of the War Powers Clause vested in
the legislature the power to "make war." James Madison and Elbridge Gerry
jointly moved to substitute the word "declare" for "make," hence the final
diction. 18 Madison and Gerry feared that the phrase "'make' war, might be
understood to 'conduct' it which was an Executive function."o' No evidence
suggests that, in substituting "declare" for "make," the Framers desired to
instill in the Executive the power to commence war or to reduce congressional
power to a mere formality. Indeed, only one delegate to either the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention or any of the thirteen original states' ratifying
conventions, Pierce Butler, appears to have suggested vesting plenary authority
to start war with the President."o There is no evidence to suggest that anyone
supported Butler's idea."' Rather, Gerry remarked that he "never expected to
hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war," and
Butler eventually disowned the position."2
Further arguments support the view that the original understanding of the
War Powers Clause allocated broad power to Congress. Scholars note that
107. U.S. CONST. art. 1, 5 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o declare War....").
io8. Lofgren, supra note 88, at 675.
iog. Id. at 676.
io. Id. at 675.
ms. Id.
112. Id. at 68o-81 n.31.
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involving more actors in the decision to declare war necessarily slows the
process. If the President had plenary power to take the country to war-with
Congress's role limited to an ex post declaration and funding of the war"' - the
decision to go to war could be swift. It would take little more than a
presidential directive to military commanders. In contrast, a decision-making
process involving Congress would be slower. At bottom, each house of
Congress must cast a vote-a process that presumably involves debate and
careful consideration. Where Congress has broad war powers, the President
must offer the legislature some ex ante justification for the proposed war.
Strong evidence supports the insight that the Founders envisioned
Congress's role as slowing a decision to let slip the dogs of war. James
Madison, for example, described war as "among the greatest of national
calamities" and sought a constitutional framework to prevent easy entry into
hostilities."' Moreover, delegates to the Convention apparently believed that
the executive branch was more likely than was the legislative branch to take the
country into war. John Hart Ely noted that " [t]here were various statements by
influential framers to the effect that executives tended to be more warlike than
legislative bodies,".s and characterized Madison's following statement as
typical: "The constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments
demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war,
and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question
of war in the Legislature." 6
James Wilson, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention from
Pennsylvania, at his state's ratifying debate, made clear that each of these
concerns was reflected in the Constitution's structure:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against
it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men,
to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war
is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration must be made with
the concurrence of the House of Representatives: from this
113. The Constitution gives Congress the power to "raise and support Armies" and "provide and
maintain a Navy." U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8.
114. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH 3 (1993) (quoting i THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316
(Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
1s. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 4 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 312-13 (G. Hunt ed., 1906)).
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circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our
national interest can draw us into a war." 7
Some evidence suggests that even those Founders who were generally
amenable to a strong Executive understood that Congress had a crucial role to
play in deciding when to bring the country to war. Alexander Hamilton, for
example, was a known advocate for a powerful presidency but proposed that
the Senate declare wars and that the President "have the direction of war when
authorized or begun.""8 The language implies that the President should not
be the one to authorize or begin war; moreover, at the time of the proposal,
not all wars were formally declared, which suggests that Hamilton's vision
of the Senate's role should transcend mere formality and affect the
substantive decision. Indeed, Hamilton wrote that the President's war power
"would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction
of the military and naval forces . . . . [The power of] declaring [] war and ...
raising and regulating of fleets and armies . . . by the Constitution under
consideration would appertain to the Legislature.""' Likewise, James Iredell
advocated for a strong presidency and strong presidential power to conduct
war once it was commenced but used similar language to describe his view of
the power to enter war."2
Indeed, in the original understanding of war powers, Congress's role was
so sweeping that it extended not only to formally declared wars but also to the
decision to use force in less severe circumstances. Charles Lofgren has
examined in great detail the debates at both the Constitutional Convention and
at each state's ratifying convention and concludes that the evidence leads to "a
reasonable conclusion that the new Congress' power 'to declare War' was not
understood [by the contemporary public] in a narrow technical sense but
rather as meaning the power to commence war, whether declared or not.""'
117. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSrrrUoN, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787,
at 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS]; see also M. Andrew Campanelli et al., The Original Understanding of the
Declare War Clause, 24 J.L. & POL. 49,57 (2008) (quoting Wilson); Lofgren, supra note 88, at
685 (quoting Wilson).
us8. Lofgren, supra note 88, at 68o (quoting i THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 292
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937).
ng. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also
Lofgren, supra note 88, at 685 (quoting Hamilton).
12o. Lofgren, supra note 88, at 686 (citing 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra
note 117, at 107-08).
121. Id. at 699.
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These underlying normative decisions informed a crucial corollary to the
"declare war" clause: Congress should play a role of primary importance in
both declared and undeclared wars. Not all wars at the time of the Founding
were formally declared.' 2 2 To the extent that formal declarations were still in
vogue, they were issued for large-scale public wars (sometimes called "perfect"
war'). But perfect war was hardly the only type of warlike activity common at
the time; rather, countries often authorized partial mobilization of private
military resources to target specific foreign entities." This was sometimes
called "imperfect" war. Justice Bushrod Washington's opinion in Bas v. Tingy
illustrates the distinction: "[H]ostilities may subsist between two nations more
confined in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and
things; and this is more properly termed imperfect war. . . ." "
Textual and historical evidence suggests that the Founders intended to
reserve to Congress the power to enter an imperfect war. First, Article I vests
in Congress the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal."' These
letters essentially authorized Americans to commit acts of war against the
subjects of other nations. Sovereigns issued these letters primarily to ship
captains who acted as official pirates for the state. This practice was how
nations waged limited naval wars in the late 1700s and how they took reprisal
when redressing national grievances. As Michael P. Kelly has noted, "The
[Constitutional] [C]onvention record does not reflect any dissent over
granting this lesser war power to Congress. Apparently the framers agreed
that the nation's legislature should control these lesser uses of force."1 2 7 In
examining the Convention record and original understanding at the time,
Lofgren argues that the best analysis of the provision was that it served "as
a kind of shorthand for vesting in Congress the power of general reprisal
outside the context of declared war. For someone in the late 178o's, this
interpretation .. . would have given the phrase meaning and would have been
consistent with history and the treatises."'12 Consequently, Lofgren concludes,
"this interpretation in turn would have given increased plausibility to the view
122. See Jules Lobel, "Little Wars" and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAHvL. REV. 61, 68-70 (1995).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37,40 (18oo).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o declare War, grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water. . . .
127. Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 MiL. L. REV. 83,116 (1993).
128. Lofgren, supra note 88, at 696.
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that Congress possessed whatever war-commencing power was not covered by
the phrase 'to declare war."' 9
Early case law, too, suggests a significant role for Congress in so-called
"imperfect wars." In Bas v. Tingy,'o Talbot v. Seeman,"' and Little v. Barreme,3
the earliest cases dealing with the matter, the Court asserted Congress's role in
authorizing imperfect as well as perfect war.'
Significantly, the same treatises that informed the Founders' grant of
power to Congress to determine the confines of imperfect war also recognized
that imperfect war could lead to perfect war.'" This understanding helps
explain why the Founders seemingly granted to Congress, in Lofgren's words,
"whatever war-commencing power was not covered by the phrase 'to declare
war."' 3 If the Founders designed a regime in which Congress would decide
when the country was to go to war but limited that role to the declaration of
"perfect" wars, the regime would be necessarily incomplete; only a regime that
also accounted for a congressional role in authorizing "imperfect" wars would
truly guard Congress's role as the war-commencing institution, as these
imperfect wars might be expected to lead to perfect wars. The decision to
reserve this power to Congress demonstrates just how sweepingly the
Constitution guarded the legislature's right to determine when the country
would go to war. As Section II.B.2 will argue, under the contemporaneous law
of nations, the power to withdraw from treaties - like the power to grant letters
12g. Id. at 696-97.
130. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.) ("Congress is empowered to declare a general
war, or congress may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects, and in time ....
Congress has not declared war in general terms; but congress has authorised hostilities on
the high seas by certain persons in certain cases.").
131. 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 1, 8 (18oi) (Marshall, C.J., for a unanimous Court) ("Congress have the
power of declaring war. They may declare a general war, or a partial war. So it may be a
general maritime war, or a partial maritime war.").
132. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804) (Marshall, C.J., for a unanimous Court) (holding that a
commander following President Adams's wartime order to intercept a ship sailing from a
French port was liable to the ship's owner because Congress had only authorized
interception of ships sailing to French ports).
133. Others have observed that this trio of cases stands for the proposition that Congress has
primacy in authorizing hostilities short of "perfect" or declared war. See, e.g., Bruce
Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of
Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REv. 447,452-57 (2011); Alfred W. Blumrosen & Steven M.
Blumrosen, Restoring the Congressional Duty To Declare War, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 407, 447-53
(2011); John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1379, 1386-87 n.27 (1988); Einspanier, supra note 86, at 993-95.
134. For an especially detailed discussion of this point, see Einspanier, supra note 86.
135. Lofgren, supra note 88, at 697.
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of marque and reprisal -would have been understood as necessarily falling to
the legislature in a system designed to empower Congress to determine matters
of war and peace.
2. The Broad Scope of Congressional War Powers Implies a Role for
Congress in Treaty Withdrawal
The Founders envisioned a system in which the legislative branch had
control over the decision to use force. Congress was to be responsible for
formal declaration of "perfect war" as well as authorization of "imperfect war,"
which authorized on behalf of the United States the use of force on a smaller
scale than formally declared wars. Its powers extended to "imperfect war" in
part because "imperfect war" could spiral into "perfect war.",, 6 It is also clear
that the Founders knew that, as a legal matter, treaty breach provided nations
with a just cause of war and, as a practical matter, that treaty breach often led
to war. It seems unlikely that a system that so jealously guarded Congress's
role in leading the nation to war would allow the Executive to act unilaterally in
ways that would give other nations the legal right to go to war against the
United States. To be meaningful, the congressional prerogative to determine
matters of war and peace would have to encompass some control over treaty
withdrawal.
For example, take the aforementioned 1778 Treaty of Alliance with France
that was based on the Model Treaty. 1 7 It conveyed to the French a host of
economic rights. Each right was "perpetual," as the treaty included no
unilateral withdrawal clause. ,8 If the United States had chosen to withdraw
unilaterally from the treaty, thereby removing these "perpetual" economic
rights, the French would have been legally entitled to declare war to vindicate
those rights. To be sure, the French might choose lesser means, but the
decision to engage in war would have been out of the United States' hands.
This was true of every U.S. treaty until 1822, since none of these treaties
included unilateral withdrawal provisions. Given the original, orthodox
136. See Lobel, supra note 122, at 68-69 ("Joseph Story, citing Blackstone, noted that the power
to issue letters of marque and reprisal was 'plainly derived from that of making war,' being
'an incomplete state of hostilities,' often ultimately leading to a formal declaration of war.
Albert Gallatin argued that the grant of letters of marque and reprisal was 'an intermediate
state between peace and war,' and generally preceded war, '[w]hen it has not been thought
proper to come to open war at once.'") (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CoNsTrrrrION OF THE UNYTED STATES § 573, at 412 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) and
8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1511 (1798)).
137. Model Treaty, supra note io.
13S. See supra note ioi and accompanying text.
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understanding that the Constitution jealously guarded congressional war
powers, it would seem illogical to deny Congress a role in such an obvious
potential cause for war.
The logic of a congressional role in treaty withdrawal comes into sharp
relief when one considers peace treaties. At the Founding, while there were
myriad just causes of action for commencing war, there was only one true way
to end a state of war: through a treaty of the peace. The seminal treatises of the
time make clear that a peace treaty was the exclusive means of formally ending
war, even when warring nations had minimized or even ceased their use of
force for prolonged periods of time. Perhaps the clearest articulation of the
importance of peace treaties comes from Burlamaqui: "[T]he enemy himself
may retake what he has lost, whenever he finds an opportunity, till by a treaty of
peace he has renounced all his pretensions."13 9 Burlamaqui's passage illustrates
that even when the sides have laid down arms, they are legally entitled to pick
them back up until they renounce all right to use force and hash out remaining
disagreements in a peace treaty. In this context, a peace treaty settles the issue
that led to war, the status of prisoners, seized property, and myriad other
potential sources of tension.
The Founders were aware of this system and, at the Convention, they
contemplated that peace treaties would serve as the exclusive means of ending
war. 40 In the first post-Convention Supreme Court case implicating war
termination, decided less than a decade after the Constitutional Convention,
Justice Chase observed that "war between two nations can only be concluded
by treaty.""' Even the Quasi-War with France -a conflict lacking any formal
declaration of war-ended through a peace treaty. As David A. Simon has
noted, "The use of a peace treaty to end the Quasi-War is a strong indication
139. 4 BURLAMAQUI, supra note 78, at 505 (emphasis added); see also 2 GROTIUS, supra note 74, at
386 ("Treaties are in general regarded as the principal instrument, by which wars are ended,
and the mediation, or decision of a third person or power is deemed a secondary or
accessory means."); 4 VATTEL, supra note 77, at 655 ("When one of the parties is reduced to
sue for peace, or both are weary of the war, then thoughts of an accommodation are
entertained, and the conditions are agreed on .... When the belligerent powers have agreed
to lay down their arms, the agreement or contract in which they stipulate the conditions of
peace, and regulate the manner in which it is to be restored and supported, is called
the treaty ofpeace.").
14o. See Mark W. Mosier, The Power To Declare Peace Unilaterally, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1609, 1613
(2003) (citing JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1173, at 98 (Little, Brown and Co. 3d ed. 1858) for the proposition that a
congressional power to make peace was unanimously rejected at the Convention in favor of
making peace through treaty).
141. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.).
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that the political branches viewed peace treaties, at the very least, as important
processes to ending war with other states." 4'
The Founders were also clear that breach of a peace treaty was tantamount
to a declaration of war. A peace treaty's only purpose was to settle all
outstanding differences between warring nations and return them to a state of
peace. Withdrawal from such a treaty could only be understood as an attempt
to return to the warring state. James Madison observed, for example, that "to
annul a Treaty of Peace, [was] equivalent to a Declaration of War."" Indeed,
the first time the United States terminated its treaty obligations was in
response to hostilities with France.44
All of this to say that the Founders and their contemporaries would have
anticipated that the United States would be party to peace treaties whose
breach would be tantamount to declaration of war. The Founders knew that
withdrawing from a peace treaty was effectively a declaration of war. Consider
the Jay Treaty with the British, which established peace and formally ended the
Revolutionary War. 4 A withdrawal from this treaty, whose purpose was to
settle war debts and establish perpetual peace, could only be understood as a
declaration of war. Because of the Founders' emphasis on congressional war
powers, it seems logical that their contemporaries understood that Congress
had a voice in such decisions.
Taken together, Congress's broad war powers combined with the
Founding-era jus ad bellum suggests that the Founders envisioned that treaty
termination would involve at least one house of Congress. No single piece of
evidence is conclusive, and this Note does not mean to suggest that the nexus
between Founding-era jus ad bellum, treaties, and congressional war powers is
sufficient to resolve all debate, especially because elements of the debate rely
more on recent practice than original intent or understanding. Rather, this
Note suggests that the debate thus far has been incomplete. While to some
extent originalism infuses every element of the debate over treaty withdrawal,
commentators and litigants have largely missed the crucial nexus between
treaty withdrawal and war powers during the Founding era. To the extent that
each side of the debate relies on certain context clues to make their arguments,
this relationship provides important evidence.
142. See David A. Simon, Ending Perpetual War? Constitutional War Termination Powers and the
Conflict Against Al Qaeda, 41PEPP. L. REV. 685,699 (2014).
143. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 2, 1791), reprinted in 5 JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw As EMBODIED IN DIPLOMATIC DiscussIoN,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 321 (1906) [hereinafter Madison Letter
to Pendleton].
144. See Bradley, supra note 27, at 789-90.
145. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116.
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III. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS
This Part addresses several potential counterarguments to my thesis. Some
of these counterarguments consider the constitutional implications of this
Note's thesis, while others question its contemporary applicability as a legal or
functional matter. This Part also discusses the implications of my argument
and my conclusion that the House of Representatives should have a vote in
treaty withdrawal.
A. Distinguishing Between the Power To Declare War and the Power To Take
Actions Bringing the Country Closer to War
This Note has argued that because treaty withdrawal was a cause of war at
the Founding, Congress should have a role in deciding whether the United
States pulls out of a treaty. One might question whether this intuition extends
to all scenarios in which presidential action might bring the country closer to
war. The Constitution reserves to the President powers that might well bring
the country to the brink of conflict. Surely, my thesis cannot mean that every
decision that might bring us closer to war is subject to congressional vote. It
would be virtually impossible for the Founders to design a system in which
Congress had a say in every decision that might functionally lead the country
closer to war if for no other reason than that such decisions are often
unpredictable. But few of these decisions could confer on the other country the
legal right to go to war.
Because treaty withdrawal would create a legal right in a foreign nation to
declare war against the United States, treaty breach can be distinguished from
other presidential actions that might provoke war. Indeed, the Founders and
their contemporaries were keenly aware of this distinction. John Jay indicated
as much in the third Federalist paper, when he discussed the relative foreign
policy powers of the federal government and the states. He observed that
although causes of war can be "real or pretended .. . it becomes useful to inquire
whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by United America as
by disunited America." 6 Jay's language implicitly acknowledged that America
would never be able to guarantee that other nations would not use "pretended"
reasons to declare war against America. At the same time, he focused on the
actions that create "just causes of war." Jay explained, "The just causes of war,
for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or from direct
violence.""
146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 14 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
147. Id.
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Furthermore, Jay implied that Congress should play a role in ensuring
adherence to treaties. For example, he defended federal (as opposed to state)
power to enter treaties, writing that the national government would produce
"fewer just causes of war," and would be "be more in their power to
accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool,
and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly
than the offending State." 8 In another instance he explained that "[w]hen
once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the
country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to
manage it." 4 9
The other main cause of just war that Jay identified, direct violence, was
constitutionally subject to congressional approval-both in the instances
of formal declarations of war and in the context of peripheral war-like acts
by the military or private citizens acting under the auspices of letters of
marque. Indeed, as has been shown, the law of nations clearly anticipated that
small-scale "imperfect" wars could lead to "perfect wars," and scholars who
have closely examined the constitutional debates indicate that Congress was
understood to have a role to play in all such actions, at least partially because of
this fact.so Given that Congress had a clear role to play in any direct violence
that might lead to just war, it makes sense that Congress would also have a role
in treaty withdrawal.
As a corollary, early practice suggests that where the President's traditional
recognition powers might have presented other nations with a just cause of
war, the Executive has involved Congress. Secretary of State John Quincy
Adams communicated this point to President James Monroe when recognizing
the independence of several South American countries during the Spanish-
American Wars of Independence. Adams noted that premature recognition
could be (and historically had been) "a cause or pretext for war."'s Quincy
Wright explains that "Secretary Adams' distinction seems to indicate the limits
of the President's power. He may recognize a fact [of sovereignty]. To do so is
not a just cause of war. A recognition before the fact is, however, intervention
and practically war, the declaration of which belongs to Congress.""s2
148. Id. at 17. Jay's use of the plural to refer to those making these decisions for the national
government is typical of Federalist No. 3, reflecting his view that the members of the national
legislature would play a role in managing such decisions.
149. Id. at 15.
150. See, e.g., Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 133, at 452-53; Lobel, supra note 122, at 68-69.
151. Quincy Wright, The Control of the Foreign Relations of the United States the Relative Rights
Duties and Responsibilities of the President of the Senate and the House and of the Judiciary in




FOUNDING-ERA JUS AD BELLUM AND DOMESTIC TREATY WITHDRAWAL
President Andrew Jackson expressed a similar view in 1836. He noted that
recognitions traditionally "have been treated by the United States as questions
of fact only, and our predecessors have cautiously abstained from deciding
upon them until the clearest evidence was in their possession to enable them
not only to decide correctly, but to shield their decisions from every unworthy
imputation."s5 Because recognition of Texas, however, was a break from this
policy and because "premature recognition under these circumstances" might
be "looked upon as justifiable cause of war," Jackson determined it was
"[c]onsistent with the spirit of the Constitution, and most safe" that the
decision, "when probably leading to war," should be taken by Congress, "that
body by whom war can alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for
sustaining its perils must be furnished." 54
To be sure, Jackson made clear that his decision was a question of
expediency and he intentionally left unanswered his view of whether the
President-with or without the Senate-was empowered to recognize Texas's
independence in these circumstances. Nevertheless, he apparently thought
involving the full Congress was "consistent with the spirit of the Constitution"
due to the possibility of giving Spain a just cause of war.'s As Wright notes,
"when the line has been close, as in the recognitions of the South American
Republics and Texas, the President has invoked the judgment and cooperation
of Congress before recognition,"' 6 due to distinction between recognition that
would create a just cause of war and that which would not.
Recognition power provides a useful parallel to treaty withdrawal. As a
general matter, the power rests with the Executive. Nevertheless, in two early
instances in which recognition might have led to war, Presidents chose to
involve Congress. To be sure, the President in each example might have been
motivated by prudential or political concerns rather than constitutional
obligation. Nevertheless the President emphasized in each instance that the
action might confer on another country a legal right to go to war against the
United States, and suggested that this implicated congressional war powers.
These examples suggest that presidential actions might be distinguishable
based on whether they conferred legal rights of war.
153. Letter from President Andrew Jackson to Congress (Dec. 21, 1836), reprinted in 3 A




156. Wright, supra note 151, at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. Unilateral Breach Versus Unilateral Withdrawal
A similar objection to this Note's thesis might be that not all treaty
breaches take the form of withdrawal; a President can breach a treaty without
terminating it. As a matter of domestic law, must the President seek Congress's
consent before violating a treaty in other ways? There is strong evidence to
suggest that, as a matter of original understanding, the President was not
empowered to unilaterally breach a treaty. To illustrate, consider a slightly
fictionalized version of President Grant's 1876 actions regarding an extradition
treaty with Great Britain. Responding to Britain's refusal to comply with
certain provisions, Grant halted extradition to Great Britain pending
congressional action.s7 Imagine that, instead of responding to Britain's breach,
Grant had refused to comply with a specific extradition request due to political
or prudential concerns about that extradition. This might have breached a
specific treaty obligation, though it would not constitute general termination of
the treaty. The originalist theory advanced in this Note suggests that, because
breach was just grounds for war under Founding-era jus ad bellum, Congress
should play a role in this decision.
Indeed, some textual and historical evidence bolsters this proposition. The
potential textual hook depends on how one views the Take Care Clause, which
requires that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."'s
A threshold question here is whether the Take Care Clause encompasses
treaties. While the issue is debated, several commentators have convincingly
argued that it does.159 They note that the Supremacy Clause counts treaties
among the "supreme Law of the Land"' 6o and point out that, at the
Constitutional Convention, delegates changed the Take Care Clause language
in a way that included treaties (although the precise motivation for the change
is unknown). **
157. Bradley, supra note 27, at 791.
158. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
is. See, e.g., Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 157-59 (2004); Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 1o8 COLUM.
L. REV. 331, 343-44 (20o8). But see MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTTUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 203
(1990) (arguing that the Take Care Clause does not extend to treaties).
16o. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
161. James Madison initially proposed language that the President was to execute "the National
Laws" and the Committee of Detail suggested that the language read "the Laws of the
United States." Either of these formulations might be read to exclude treaties, but the
eventual adoption by the Committee of Style of "the laws" helped obviate this problem. See
Swaine, supra note 159, at 343-44.
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A second question is what, exactly, the Take Care Clause requires of the
President. In the treaty context, strong evidence from the Founding era
suggests that the President was expected to carry out all treaty commitments.
In 1793, President Washington issued his Proclamation of Neutrality,
announcing that America would remain neutral in a war between France and
other European nations."z Opponents of the Proclamation, including James
Madison, expressed consternation that it violated America's obligations under
its Treaty of Alliance with France, thus flouting the President's duties under
the Take Care Clause.'6 3 Importantly, supporters of the Proclamation,
including Alexander Hamilton, did not argue that violating the treaty fell
within Washington's prerogatives under the Take Care Clause. Instead, they
asserted that the Proclamation did not constitute a violation of the treaty.'*6
Both sides seemed to agree that Washington lacked discretionary authority to
breach, for he had a duty to execute the treaty faithfully. 6 s
In a similar vein, then-Congressman John Marshall suggested that it was
incumbent upon the President to ensure that all treaty provisions were
faithfully executed. Marshall was responsible for defending President John
Adams from congressional censure following Adams's extradition of Jonathan
Robbins to Great Britain. The Jay Treaty with Britain included an extradition
provision, but Adams's actions generated significant controversy because no
statute had authorized Robbins's extradition. Speaking on the House floor,
Marshall argued that while "Congress unquestionably may prescribe the mode
[of executing a treaty], and Congress may devolve on others the whole
execution of the contract," until it does so, "it seems the duty of the Executive
department to execute the [treaty] . . . by any means it possesses.",6 6
Of course, not all treaty breaches are created equal. There is a qualitative
difference between the United Kingdom's uncontroversial decision to
temporarily amend commercial shipping routes in St. Helena and Russia's
highly controversial decision to commence naval exercises in the Black Sea.
Withdrawal from a perpetual treaty is far more open and controversial than
a minor, discretionary interpretation of a treaty clause and thus seems
more analogous to the latter example. In this regard, for the purposes of
my argument, there is no need to delineate the threshold at which a breach
is sufficiently serious as to warrant congressional involvement because
162. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 159, at 157-59.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 158-59.
165. Id. at 159-60; see Swaine, supra note 159, at 344-45.
166. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 159, at 159; see also Swaine, supra note 159, at 346 (discussing this
history in depth).
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withdrawal seems far beyond that line. It is worth highlighting, however, two
aspects of Supreme Court jurisprudence that support the notion that executive
authority to breach is limited. First, unlike in the contemporary era, the early
Supreme Court was not especially deferential to the Executive's interpretation
of treaties.' Second, courts have generally required clear congressional intent
to override treaty provisions. Justice Harlan cited Vattel in articulating the
reasons underlying this principle:
[T]he court should be slow to assume that Congress intended to violate
the stipulations of a treaty, so recently made with the government of
another country. "There would no longer be any security," says Vattel,
"no longer any commerce between mankind, if they did not think
themselves obliged to keep faith with each other, and to promises." ,, 6
These two principles, read together, suggest that, in the early days of the
Republic, courts were loathe to accept the notion that the President has
inherent authority or discretion to breach treaties.
A system that prevented the President from unilaterally breaching a treaty
(even without terminating it) would be sensible. Were the President able to
breach without the consent of Congress, a whole treaty-which the Senate had
played a role in approving -might be voided, even if the nation did not go to
war over the breach. It is difficult to imagine that that the Founders and their
contemporaries envisioned a system in which, say, President Washington, with
two-thirds of the Senate, would ratify a treaty in 1796 but President Adams
could unilaterally breach one of its provisions in 1797, thus jeopardizing the
whole framework.
C. The Changed Law ofNations Should Not Upend Separation ofPowers
A potent counterargument to this Note is that changes in international law
have undermined the main rationale for a congressional role in treaty
withdrawal. Whatever the law of nations was at the Founding, contemporary
international law includes a broad prohibition on the use of force -embedded
in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 6 9 - and contemporary jus ad bellum
167. See generally David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 497 (2007).
168. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 539 (1884) (internal citations omitted).
169. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
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identifies only limited circumstances that can overcome this prohibition.'
Treaty breach is not one of these circumstances; in contemporary international
law, a nation may not resort to force in contravention of Article 2(4) if its rights
were violated by treaty breach. Likewise, contemporary treaties, unlike those at
the Founding, often include withdrawal provisions that establish a legal basis
for withdrawal without breach. In light of these changes, one might question
this Note's contemporary application.
The answer to this question depends largely on the extent to which one
thinks the Constitution's prescriptions for domestic law shift as international law
does. Some constitutional provisions clearly anticipate changes to international
law. 17' For example, Congress has the constitutional power to "define and
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations."'" There is little doubt that
today's Congress could pass a statute pursuant to these powers that define and
punish an act as a violation of the contemporary laws of nations, even if the act
did not violate the Founding-era law of nations.'"
At the same time, it unclear whether shifts in international law can shift
every element of constitutional structure. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Zivotofsky v. Kerry suggests that context clues from Founding-era jus ad bellum
170. There are three clear exceptions to this prohibition and one possible additional exception.
First, Article 51 of the Charter allows for the use of force pursuant to individual or collective
self-defense. U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations . .. ."). Second, Article 42 of the Charter permits the United Nations
Security Council to vote to approve the use of force. U.N. Charter art. 42 ("[T]he Security
Council ... may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security."). Third, force may be used by one state in the
territory of a second state when the second state consents. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al.,
Consent-Based Humanitarian Intervention: Giving Sovereign Responsibility Back to the Sovereign,
46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 499, 505 n.28 (2013) (listing authorities for this proposition). Finally,
many have argued that customary international law allows for the use of force in instances
of humanitarian emergency, though this is heavily debated. Compare Hathaway et al., supra,
at 521 ("Unauthorized humanitarian interventions remain prohibited under Article 2(4). The
variant [of scholarship] that focuses on emerging customary international law does not
accurately describe state practice."), with Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of
Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), JUST SECURITY
(Oct. 2, 2013, 9:oo AM), http://justsecurity.org/15o6/koh-syria-part2 [http://perma.cc
/CWK2-4HJZ] ("I believe that international law has evolved sufficiently to permit morally
legitimate action to prevent atrocities by responding to the deliberate use of chemical
weapons.").
171. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (20o6).
1n. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 10.
17. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (discussing the Torture Victims
Protection Act as "authority that establishes an unambiguous and modern basis for federal
claims of torture and extrajudicial killing" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2431
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
remain salient." Zivotofsky considered whether Congress had power to compel
the executive branch to indicate on the passport of a U.S. citizen born in
Jerusalem that his birthplace was Israel, in contravention of the executive
branch's longstanding position that no country has sovereignty over
Jerusalem.' The core legal question of the case was whether so-called
"recognition powers" (i.e., the powers to recognize a foreign government as the
rightful sovereign of a particular territory) are vested exclusively in the
executive branch or whether Congress can, through legislation, direct the
executive branch to recognize a sovereign. The Court held that Congress
cannot recognize a sovereign because recognition power rests exclusively with
the executive branch.17 6 Notwithstanding the fact that "the Constitution does
not use the term 'recognition,"' the Court examined context clues from the
Founding-era law of nations, noting that "[a]t the time of the founding ...
prominent international scholars suggested that receiving an ambassador was
tantamount to recognizing the sovereignty of the sending state."" The Court
concluded that, because the Constitution confers on the President the exclusive
power to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," it "is a logical and
proper inference, then, that a Clause directing the President alone to receive
ambassadors would be understood to acknowledge his power to recognize
other nations ."7 The Court's reasoning here parallels this Note's analysis that
contextual clues from Founding-era jus ad bellum and the War Powers Clause
lead to an inference that Congress has a role to play in treaty withdrawal.
To be sure, Zivotofsky is not a perfect parallel, as international law may not
have shifted as significantly in the recognition context as it has in the jus ad
bellum context.1 9 Zivotofsky did not rest solely on the Court's inference about
the Founding era. The majority also considered historical practices and the
current state of international law.8o Indeed, Justice Thomas's concurrence
explicitly noted:
174. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
175. See id. at 2081-84.
176. Id. at 2096.
177. Id. at 2084-85.
178. Id. at 2085.
179. Some have questioned this point. See Jean Galbraith, International Law and Separation of
Powers, 99 VA. L. REv. 987, 1043-44 (2013) ("The sole organ doctrine that spurred the
President's recognition power is no longer as important to international law as it was in the
nineteenth century."). But see JAMES R. CRAwFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 17-20 (2d ed. 2007).
i8o. See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084-88.
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I assume, as the majority does, that the recognition power conferred on
the President by the Constitution is the power to accomplish the act of
recognition as that act is defined under international law. It is possible, of
course, that the Framers had a fixed understanding of the act of recognition
that is at odds with the definition of that act under international law. But the
majority does not make that argument . . .. Lacking any evidence that
the modern practice of recognition deviates in any relevant way from
the historical practice, or that the original understanding of the
recognition power was something other than the power to take part in
that practice, I proceed on the same assumption as the majority. 8 '
It seems likely that the means of recognition need not be "fixed" in Founding-
era conceptions; for example, if international law acknowledged a new way for
the Executive to recognize a sovereign, it is doubtful that this would pose a
constitutional problem. It is unclear, however, how the Court would respond if
Congress could unilaterally act under international law to recognize a foreign
sovereign or to compel the President to do so. The Zivotofsky majority held that
"[t]he text and structure of the Constitution grant the President the power to
recognize foreign nations and governments,"'8' noting that "[t]he Constitution
thus assigns the President means to effect recognition on his own initiative." 8 ,
In contrast, the Court noted, "Congress ... has no constitutional power that
would enable it to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign nation.",8 4
If one believes that the Constitution incorporates a dynamic, rather than
static, conception of international law, this Note's argument may have little
contemporary relevance. This is a reasonable position and is not obviously
inconsistent with Zivotofsky. 8 s Even one who subscribes to this view, however,
will find that this Note offers a distinct and underexplored legal justification
for the recent trend in presidential unilateralism. It is worth highlighting again,
however, that the practice of presidential unilateralism predates the U.N.
Charter, thus preceding Article 2(4)'s change to international jus ad bellum. 86
Moreover, Zivotofsky indicates that courts might be somewhat reluctant to
accept the view that a shift in international law has altered domestic separation
of powers. Jean Galbraith has recently argued that, "while many constitutional
181. Id. at 2111 n.9 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 2086.
183. Id.
184. Id.
i8s. For one such perspective, see Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in
the Washington Administration, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 373 (2012).
186. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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actors and commentators today accept international law as a direct principle of
constitutional interpretation in certain areas of constitutional law, they do not
treat it as similarly relevant to the separation of powers."' 8  Indeed, her
research suggests that the Zivotofsky Court's opinion might have conflated
constitutional principles with early practices, to the advantage of the
Executive.s8 8 Her analysis brings to bear two issues. First, separation of powers
is treated as distinct from other constitutional issues in terms of how it is
affected by international law, which she laments. This suggests that, unlike
other constitutional issues, the Court might be loath to subject separation of
powers to shifts in international law. Second, to the extent that Galbraith is
correct that the Court has conflated historical practices (rooted in
contemporaneous international law) with structural constitutional questions,
these practices are from the earliest days of the Republic, which would militate
towards a protection of congressional withdrawal power.
D. Distinguishing Among Treaties
One might argue that a role for Congress is warranted only for treaties that
bring us closer to war as a practical matter, even if not as a formal legal matter.
A Senate Resolution introduced in response to the Goldwater case suggests this
view: it "[p]rohibit[ed treaty] termination or suspension by the President
without Congressional approval where . . . imminent involvement of the
United States Armed Forces in hostilities or other danger to national security
would result."' Whereas this Note is rooted in questions about what U.S.
actions would give other nations a legal right to go to war, a skeptic might
replace the jus ad bellum analysis with a more functional approach, asking
whether U.S. withdrawal could actually bring the United States closer to a
state of war because of the response of other nations, even if their response
contravenes international law.
As an initial matter, even on this view, Congress would be entitled to a
greater role in treaty withdrawal for certain important agreements. For
example, withdrawal from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START
Treaty) limiting nuclear arsenals would likely meet the criterion of sufficiently
implicating war and peace.'90
187. Galbraith, supra note 179, at 992.
188. See Jean Galbraith, Zivotofsky v. Kerry and the Balance ofPower, 109 AJIL UNBOuND 16, 20
(2015).
189. See S. Res. 15, 9 6th Cong. (1979).
igo. See Baker, supra note 34.
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However, there is little historical or textual basis for differentiating among
treaties as a matter of constitutional law. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged as
much in Goldwater (albeit to the benefit of the Executive):
There is no judicially ascertainable and manageable method of making
any distinction among treaties on the basis of their substance, the
magnitude of the risk involved, the degree of controversy which their
termination would engender, or by any other standards. 91
Historically, as a legal matter, breach of a peace treaty or commercial treaty
alike could lead to war. Breaching the former was tantamount to an affirmative
declaration of war; breaching the latter conferred on the counterparty ajus ad
bellum right. The Founding-era law of peace treaties sheds light on the legal
rejoinder. Recall that the Founders were aware that, at international law, peace
treaties were the exclusive means of ending war and, at the Convention, they
contemplated that peace treaties would serve as the exclusive domestic legal
means of doing so."' The Founders and their contemporaries would have
anticipated that the United States would be party to peace treaties whose
breach would be tantamount to declaration of war. Nevertheless, the
Constitution does not distinguish between treaties. As the D.C. Circuit noted
in Goldwater, "We cannot find an implied role in the Constitution for the
Senate in treaty termination for some but not all treaties in terms of their
relative importance.""' Indeed, scholars on both sides of the withdrawal
debate have suggested that the Constitution's text and structure do not create
formal distinctions among types of treaties."'
A letter from Madison to Edmund Pendleton provides the strongest
evidence in favor of distinguishing between treaties. Writing about adverse
treaty breach (in other words, instances in which the United States was
victimized by breach), Madison pondered which branch of government would
191. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707 (1979).
192. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
193. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 707.
194. See Berger, supra note 58, at 584 n.52 ("Professor Lowenfeld correctly observes that we
cannot derive from the Constitution a scheme for defense treaties different from that
applicable to treaties on the myriad of other subjects . . . ." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Henkin, supra note 19, at 654 (noting that while Congress might be especially
resistant to unilateral presidential withdrawal from treaties that "implicate our defense
posture or otherwise bring us close to war," this is an argument "to urge that the President
should not act to terminate an important treaty without at least meaningful consultation
with Congress, congressional committees, congressional leaders. It is not an argument for
distorting constitutional doctrine to require a vote of Congress").
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be empowered to make the determination that the United States had suffered
such breach:
In case it should be advisable to take advantage of the adverse breach, a
question may perhaps be started, whether the power vested by the
Constitution with respect to Treaties in the President and Senate makes
them competent Judges, or whether, as the Treaty is a law, the whole
Legislature are to judge of its annulment, or whether, in case the
President and Senate be competent in ordinary Treaties, the Legislative
authority be requisite to annul a Treaty ofpeace, as being equivalent to a
Declaration of war, to which that authority alone, by our Constitution,
is competent.' 95
Notably, Madison did not consider the possibility that the President alone
would be positioned to announce an adverse breach (in an early Court case,
Justice James Iredell indicated Congress alone had the power to do so196 ).
More importantly for purposes of the question of distinguishing among
treaties, the issue in Madison's letter is qualitatively different from that of
distinguishing among treaties for purposes of withdrawal. Under Founding-
era jus ad bellum, once the United States suffered a breach by its counterparty,
it would be legally entitled to take action. But it would not be compelled to
do so. At the same time, were the United States to breach, the counterparty
could legally declare war. As a result, it makes sense to distinguish among
treaties when the United States is deciding how to respond to breach (for
example, whether to annul a peace treaty, thus causing war, a subject for
the full Congress, or whether to annul a commercial treaty, which would not
necessarily lead to war unless the United States chose to take that step). If the
concern is potential war and its interplay with congressional war powers,
it makes significantly less sense under the Founding-era legal framework
to distinguish among treaties when deciding whether to withdraw if that
withdrawal would confer a legal right on the counterparty regardless of the
content of the breached treaty. As a practical matter, it is not clear how easy it
would have been to predict which treaty withdrawals would lead to war and
which would not. The United States itself went to war with Mexico in 1846 at
least partially because of violations of a treaty regarding settlement of debt.1 97
195. Madison Letter to Pendleton, supra note 143.
196. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.). But see AMAR, supra
note 43, at 561-63 n.33 (taking the view that the President should be understood to have this
authority, based in part on an essay by Alexander Hamilton).
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Additionally, many Founding-era commercial agreements with other nations
were tied to peace agreements."'
Some commentators have argued for a functional distinction. Louis
Henkin, while acknowledging that the Constitution does not distinguish
between treaties with regard to formal processes,' 99 suggested that the
Constitution might require greater consultation with Congress if a proposed
withdrawal "seriously . . . implicate[d] our defense posture or otherwise
br[ought] us close to war, since that would undercut the constitutional power
of Congress to decide for war or peace."2oo Founding-era treaties often
included promises of both peace and commerce,=' which might explain the
lack of constitutional distinction. Today, the ability to distinguish treaties
seems more straightforward, but, from a practical perspective, it is not clear
that such a distinction is always workable. Some treaties, such as tax
agreements, are extremely unlikely to lead to implicate war and peace. Others,
like the New START Treaty, seem to implicate it more clearly." 2 Between
these ends of the spectrum, however, there is a murky middle. The treaty
withdrawal that led to the Kucinich litigation reflects the difficulty of
distinguishing between treaties that create the risk of war and treaties that do
not. In withdrawing from the treaty, President Bush suggested that the move
would make America less likely to go to war, because the "ABM treaty
hinder[ed] our government's ways to protect our people from future terrorist
or rogue state missile attacks. . .. [and the] treaty . . . prevent[ed] us from
developing effective defenses."" 3 Several experts disagreed, suggesting that the
move would aggravate relations with Russia and China and spell a body blow
for the global nuclear nonproliferation movement. 4 Indeed, Russia, the
United States' counterparty, suggested it would aggravate a nuclear arms
race. 5
19g. See, e.g., Model Treaty, supra note io.
199. See HENKIN, supra note 30, at 170.
zoo. Henkin, supra note 19, at 654.
2o. See, e.g., Model Treaty, supra note loi.
202. The New START Treaty limits certain U.S. and Russian weaponry. President Obama
described the New START Treaty as "the most significant arms control agreement in nearly
two decades." See Baker, supra note 34.
203. Terence Neilan, Bush Pulls Out ofABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec.
13, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/200/i2/13/internationayl3CND-BUSH.html [http://
perma.cc/6STX-PWXK].
204. See ABM Treaty Withdrawal Neither Necessary nor Prudent, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N (Dec. 13,
2001), http://www.armscontrol.org/node/2515 [http://perma.cc/JB8Z-KRLM].
2os. See America Withdraws from ABM Treaty, BBC NEws (Dec. 13, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/americas/1707812.stm [http://perma.cc/3CLJ-ZSZX].
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The ABM Treaty withdrawal demonstrates that anticipating which treaty
withdrawals might bring the United States closer to war is a difficult exercise,
especially in a global order in which the United States plays a primary role in
international coalitions to deal with myriad problems. What President Bush
viewed as a measure that might keep the United States out of war by
preventing attacks, others viewed as likely to bring the United States closer to a
state of war. Had the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
increased the likelihood of a nonstate actor or rogue nation acquiring a nuclear
weapon, it seems as likely as not that the United States would have seriously
considered being a part of an international military coalition to address the
crisis. In such a situation, if recent history is a guide, the President might act
without explicit congressional authorization, leaving Congress out of the
picture entirely. Even if Congress were given the chance to vote, it would be
acting in a crisis that might force its hand, rather than being given the
opportunity to weigh the potential of such a crisis before the initial treaty
withdrawal.
The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) offers a concrete example of
an international agreement that ostensibly does not implicate defense, but from
which withdrawal could conceivably lead to U.S. military engagement. Several
Asian countries have suggested that the TPP signals a U.S. "counterweight to
China's efforts to expand its influence not just in trade but in other areas,
including its island-building in the disputed South China Sea.",, As one
commentator has suggested, "the TPP is not just about economics . . . it has
the potential to be a pillar of American grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific for
decades to come."1 7 Imagine a scenario in which President Obama can
convince Congress to approve the TPP but is then replaced by a presidential
candidate who has signaled his or her disapproval of the TPP. Unilateral
presidential withdrawal from the TPP might embolden China or weaken U.S.
allies in the region, making issues such as disputed South China Sea islands
more likely to lead to a conflict that entangles the United States. This situation
is further complicated by the fact that the United States is committed to mutual
defense treaties with fifty-four nations, meaning that it has a legal obligation to
assist these nations should they be attacked."8 Nations involved in the South
2o6. Jane Perlez, U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on China, N.Y. TmEs
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.comf/2o1S/io/o7/world/asia/trans-pacific-partnership
-china-australia.html [http://perma.cc/6NJV-L6RZ].
207. Sean Mirski, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: China, America and the Balance of Power, NAT'L
INTEREST (July 6, 2015), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-trans-pacific-partnership
-china-america-the-balance-13264 [http://perma.cc/3TWF-K8BC].
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China Sea dispute are among those with which the United States has mutual
defense treaties. 9
I do not mean to suggest that, if the United States were to accede to and
later withdraw from the TPP, it would go to war the next day. The upshot is
simply that, in an interdependent world in which the United States plays a
primary role in many international uses of force, it is difficult to determine ex
ante whether treaty withdrawal will functionally make it more likely for the
United States to go to war. Notwithstanding platonic ideals on each end, the
line between a treaty implicating war and peace and a treaty not implicating
war and peace may often be difficult to identify.
This is aggravated by a classic "first-mover advantage" dynamic. If there is
disagreement between the executive and legislative branches about whether
withdrawal from a particular treaty implicates questions of war and peace
(with Congress arguing that it does and the President arguing that it does not),
the President has the first-mover advantage and can elect to withdraw from the
treaty, forcing Congress to file suit to vindicate its position.21 o Courts are
especially ill-positioned to make such a determination, which implicates subtle
questions of geopolitics, and might be especially loath to do so if the President
has already taken steps to withdraw.m
In practice, courts are poorly equipped to apply Henkin's murky
distinction. To the extent that one takes seriously this Note's historical
insights, but espouses the notion that Congress ought to have a say in
withdrawal from treaties that implicate functional, if not legal, questions of
war and peace, there is a strong argument for a bright-line rule that all treaty
withdrawals must be subject to congressional vote.
E. The House Should Have a Vote
The foregoing analysis raises the question of what congressional
involvement in treaty withdrawal should look like. There are several plausible
options, including a two-thirds vote of the Senate, a simple Senate majority
vote, or the involvement of both houses of Congress. Because of the
relationship between war powers and treaty withdrawal, this Note argues that
209. Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Apr. 2012), http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p2 7883 [http://
perma.cc/2N44-S3QK ]; U.S. Collective Defensive Arrangements, supra note 208.
210. See Abebe, supra note 5, at 235-36.
211. Cf Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("There is no judicially
ascertainable and manageable method of making any distinction among treaties on the basis
of their substance, the magnitude of the risk involved, the degree of controversy which their
termination would engender, or by any other standards.").
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a simple majority of each House should be required, mirroring the war
declaration process. As this section discusses, adhering to such a procedure
would also have certain prudential advantages.
An approach that mirrored treaty accession would suggest that only the
Senate must be involved in treaty withdrawal. A treaty takes effect following a
two-thirds vote of the Senate, so why not require a two-thirds vote of the
Senate to terminate? This would parallel the principle that congressionally
enacted legislation requires an equivalent congressional vote for repeal.m A
strict adherence to this mirroring principle would suggest a two-thirds Senate
vote is required to withdraw from a treaty because a two-thirds Senate vote is
required to enter a treaty."
Requiring a two-thirds vote of the Senate would also protect a healthy
respect for the states and federalism by ensuring that a large majority of the
states' representatives in the Senate would have a say. In establishing the two-
thirds vote for treaty accession, the Framers wanted to ensure that any treaty
would have to clear a high threshold, due to concerns about the potential
impact of treaties on certain groups of states (for example, a trade treaty that
might negatively impact Southern economic interests).* By creating a high
threshold, the Treaty Clause anticipated that if a potential accord would
negatively impact over one-third of the states, the federal government could
not accede to it. A similar principle might apply to treaty withdrawal. One can
imagine a situation in which the United States is party to a treaty with strong
benefits to a grouping of just over one-third of states, with the corollary
consequence of withdrawal being negative economic impact on those states; a
system that required a two-thirds Senate vote to withdraw from the treaty
would protect the economic interests of that grouping of states.
To be sure, a system that included the Senate could also operate through
simple majority voting. A simple majority vote system to withdraw from
treaties might be viewed as more democratic. Indeed, if one views entry into a
treaty as an aberration from the status quo, there may be a normative
difference between situations where representatives of more than one-third of
the states are skeptical of entry into a treaty (leaving the status quo) and
situations where one-third can block withdrawal from a treaty (returning to
212. Cf Berger, supra note 58, at 585 ("[T]hough the Constitution is also silent concerning repeal
of a statute, the right of the maker, Congress, to repeal is undoubted.").
213. See ADLER, supra note 40, at 84-113 (arguing that treaty termination should require a two-
thirds Senate vote).
214. See, e.g., id. at 90-91.
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the status quo). s Moreover, a simple majority vote of the Senate would reflect
the principle that it should be easier to disentangle the nation from foreign
alliances than to entangle it.
While both of these options have some merit, this Note's analysis of jus ad
bellum and congressional war powers suggests that the House of
Representatives should have a role in deciding whether or not to terminate
treaties, alongside a simple majority of the Senate. The Framers anticipated
that both houses of Congress would vote to take the country to war by simple
majority vote. War authorization specifically included the House of
Representatives precisely because it was the more democratically accountable
branch of government. Henkin acknowledges this point when he speculates
that we might treat differently some treaties that might have the practical effect
of causing war.' 6 The House was originally the only directly elected body, and
each of its Members faces frequent reelection and represents relatively few
people when compared to the Senate or President." Similarly, the practice
regarding recognition during the Spanish-American wars of independence and
Texas's Revolution emphasized that the full Congress should vote on matters
that might lead to war. To the extent that one is convinced that the original
understanding of treaty withdrawal implicated congressional war powers, the
necessary conclusion is that the President may only terminate a treaty with the
approval of both houses of Congress. Relatedly, going to war without the
consent of the House would be democratically deficient; a similar argument
might be made for treaty withdrawal. Whatever the normative underpinnings
of the war-declaration framework, the legal consequences of this Note's
argument seem apparent: if congressional withdrawal power is properly
understood to be, as an originalist matter, tied to war powers, then each House
should have a simple majority vote. Requiring a simple majority of the Senate
(as opposed to two-thirds) comports with this understanding. Moreover, it
might strike a happy medium between making foreign disentanglements too
difficult and making them too easy. Senator Goldwater noted the problems of
making disentanglement too easy when criticizing unilateral withdrawal in
1978: he argued that unilateral withdrawal means that no treaty counterparty
"can be assured that [a treaty] will last any longer than the whim of the single
215. Cf id. at 89 (discussing the distinction between foreign entanglements and foreign
disentanglements).
216. Henkin, supra note 19, at 654.
217. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 2.
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person who happens to sit in the Oval Office at any given moment of
history. ,,8
Beyond the legal argument for involving a simple majority of each House,
this approach yields some prudential benefits. Such a procedure would help
harmonize treaties and congressional-executive agreements. To be sure, there
would still be significant dissonance between the two forms of international
lawmaking, since the former requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate and the
latter requires a majority vote of the full Congress. Nevertheless, an inability to
harmonize the process through which international agreements are made does
not devalue parity among the processes through which they are unmade. While
the law surrounding withdrawal from such congressional-executive
agreements is far from settled, Oona Hathaway notes the basic principle that
"[t] he President is not able to terminate a statute unilaterally, and hence cannot
terminate the statutory enactment that gives rise to a congressional-executive
agreement." 9
Moreover, involving the House would also create parity within Article II
treaties due to the self-execution doctrine. In short, the self-execution doctrine
has created a system in which some Article II treaties (non-self-executing)
require Congress to pass implementing legislation through ordinary processes,
while others (self-executing) take legal effect immediately upon ratification.2 0
This bifurcated system means that a President can unilaterally obviate the
domestic legal consequences of a self-executing Article II treaty through
unilateral withdrawal; in contrast, once implementing legislation is passed,
both houses of Congress must vote to repeal the legislation to repeal the legal
effects of a non-self-executing treaty.
Such parity has important value. Relative to other countries, the United
States has one of the more complicated domestic legal frameworks for entering
international agreements. In this regard, parity in withdrawal procedures
might clarify the process and allay potential concerns of its counterparties.
218. Kenneth Bredemeier, Goldwater, Other Lawmakers File Suit over Repeal of Taiwan
Defense Pact, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 1978), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics
/1978/12/23/goldwater-other-lawmakers-file-suit-over-repeal-of-taiwan-defense-pact/588ec
6e8-eid6-430o-b598-dc77faf27oa9 [http://perma.cc/8QP6-QA74].
219. Hathaway, supra note 31, at 1334-35.
220. For an in-depth discussion of the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties, see, for example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES S 111 (AM. LAw. INST. 1987); David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson:
The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. 301 (2012);
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On the domestic front, parity would remove a potential disincentive for a
President to pursue an Article II treaty. Consider a situation in which a
President is equally confident in his ability to pass ordinary legislation
pursuant to a congressional-executive agreement and in his ability to get the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate to approve an Article II treaty. As the law
currently stands, he is disincentivized from pursuing the latter option, because
his successor can simply unilaterally withdraw from the Article II treaty. By
contrast, ushering through the international accord as a congressional-
executive agreement will functionally require his successor to involve Congress
in any withdrawal process. If he were concerned about what his successor
might do, why, then, would he choose an Article II treaty? This is not too
farfetched a concern. Consider, again, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which
President Obama is pursuing as a congressional-executive agreement and
which has drawn criticism from candidates who seek to succeed President
Obama.22 Consider, hypothetically, a situation in which President Obama
could give the TPP domestic legal effect as either a congressional-executive
agreement or an Article II treaty. Under the current regime, it would be
potentially destructive to his agenda to pursue the latter rather than the former,
as a future President could simply withdraw from the accord, congressional
opinion notwithstanding. The historical example of President Bush's unilateral
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty further illustrates the point. Had President
Nixon pursued the accord as a congressional-executive agreement, Congress
would have had to vote to repeal the statute that gave rise to the ABM Treaty
for withdrawal to have domestic legal effect. It is unlikely that President Bush
would have had the votes to proceed.' To the extent that one believes that the
majority of international agreements should be conducted through the
221. See Elaina Plott, Ted Cruz's Protectionist Gamble, NAT'L REv. (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www
.nationalreview.com/article/42739/ted-cruz-tpp-opposition-gamble [http://perma.cc/7UP4
-VVM4]; Kathryn Robinson, Hillary Clinton Addresses Trans-Pacific Partnership in
Iowa, NBC NEws (June 14, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.coM/politics/2O16-electioVhillary
-addresses-trans-pacific-partnership-her-first-major-rally-n375196 [http://perma.cc/VH7L
-S7YJ]; Bernie Sanders, Opinion, The TPP Must Be Defeated, HUFFINGTON POST (May
21, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/the-tpp-must-be-defeated_b
7352166.html [http://perma.cc/HU4G-26G8]; Jordan Weissmann, Is It Possible Donald
Trump Was Right About China and the TPP?, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.slate
.con/blogs/moneybox/2o/i/12/is-donald-trump-right about china andthe-tpp.html
[http://perma.cc/7ASs-RK4J].
222. Democrats controlled the Senate at the time and expressed concern about the withdrawal.
Senator Carl Levin, who chaired the relevant Senate Committee, was among those averse to
a withdrawal. See James Dao, Skeptical Senators Question Rumsfrld on Missile Defense, N.Y.
TIMEs (June 22, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo/o6/22/us/skeptical-senators-
question-rumsfeld-on-missile-defense.html [http://perma.cc/NZH5-3X72].
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constitutionally specified Article II process, one might want to remove this
disincentive for the President to pursue this process."
CONCLUSION
The Constitution's text and the Supreme Court's precedents have left a
crucial question of foreign relations law to the political branches.
Consequently, the executive branch usually has the ability to outmuscle
the legislature. Yet the legal debate about the proper role of Congress in
these procedures remains unsettled. This Note argues that the original
understanding of the relationship between treaty withdrawal andjus ad bellum
militates in favor of a stronger role for the people's representatives in Congress.
Although the debate over treaty withdrawal has been robust -implicating
everything from original understanding to constitutional structure to historical
practice- the debate thus far has largely overlooked a crucial point about
original intent and understanding. As this Note has shown, the Founders' deep
understanding of the law of nations likely means that they anticipated
congressional involvement in treaty withdrawal. Treaty withdrawal was
tantamount to treaty breach, and treaty breach was perhaps the preeminent
cause of just war under Founding-era jus ad bellum. Given the Founders'
jealous guarding of congressional war powers, it seems likely that they
anticipated that treaty withdrawal -an act that so intimately implicated war -
would involve Congress. An originalist analysis of congressional war powers
and jus ad bellum lends significant support to the argument for restoring
Congress's role in this important domain of foreign affairs.
223. For one perspective on the importance of Article II treaties, see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,
io8 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995). There is some debate as to the relative international value of
Article II treaties versus congressional-executive agreements. Compare Lisa L. Martin, The
President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 44o (2005), with Hathaway, supra note 31.
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